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With the remarkable proliferation of mobile devices (e.g., smartphones and portable
tablets) embedded with various sensors, such as camera, GPS, digital compass, gy-
roscope, and thermometers, more and more devices are used for collecting message
from surrounding environment, and then deliver the collected message (e.g., photos
or videos of the points of interest) to the control center for further processing, which
drive the development of a new research paradigm on data uploading. Data upload-
ing, which can provide mission-critical messages collected by mobile devices, and then
make quick responses during flooding, hurricanes, earthquakes, or other natural dis-
asters, is regarded as a critical issue in cellular networks. Various applications have
been proposed based on data uploading, including public safety, healthcare, disaster
response, environment monitoring, and traffic management. In such applications, as
the data collected by the devices is delay-sensitive, data uploading may be required
to be performed within a specified time frame. In practice, however, little attention
has been paid to latency-aware data uploading. As a consequence, for an efficient
support of mobile applications, it is of great importance to design low-latency data
uploading scheme in cellular networks.
Extensive research efforts have been devoted to data uploading in cellular net-
works. Most of them focused on traditional cellular networks with no cooperation,
where the devices directly deliver their data to the cellular infrastructure. In these
works, to deliver data to the cellular infrastructure, the devices need to have uplink
channels with good quality. That is to say, it is difficult for a device suffering from a
poor quality uplink channel to directly deliver data to the cellular infrastructure. In
light of this, device-to-device (D2D) communication among the devices is considered
to be one promising solution to this limitation, where the devices in proximity can
build D2D cooperation so that the device with poor quality uplink channel can select
a device with good quality uplink channel to serve as a relay for data uploading. Our
work focuses on the data uploading in D2D-enabled cellular networks.
The available studies on the data uploading in D2D-enabled cellular networks
suffer from three major limitations. First, in these studies, D2D cooperation is only
limited to devices with uploading data, while the devices without uploading data do
not participate in D2D cooperation, which usually leads to a large data uploading
latency. Second, these studies mainly consider cooperation scenario with full trust
where cooperative devices have full trustworthy relationships with each other, which
largely neglects the effect of human social relationships on the cooperation behaviors
and may result in a low data uploading reliability. Third, these works lack of an
incentive mechanism to stimulate devices to actively participate in the D2D coopera-
tion, which may degrade the data uploading performances in terms of reliability and
latency. To overcome the above limitations, this thesis investigates the low-latency
data uploading in D2D-enabled cellular networks with the help of device cooperation,
human social relationship and incentive mechanism.
Firstly, we propose a generalized cooperative data uploading scheme which con-
siders D2D cooperation among both the devices with and without uploading data, so
that the data uploading latency can be reduced. This scheme covers the conventional
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schemes where D2D cooperation is only limited to devices with uploading data as
special cases. In this scheme, to motivate D2D cooperation among all available de-
vices, we organize the devices within communication range by offering them rewards
to construct multi-hop D2D chains for data uploading. Specifically, we formulate the
problem of chain formation among the devices for data uploading as a coalitional
game. Based on merge-and-split rules, we develop a coalition formation algorithm to
obtain the solution for the formulated coalitional game with convergence on a sta-
ble coalitional structure. Extensive numerical results show the effectiveness of our
proposed scheme in reducing the average data uploading latency.
Considering the data uploading reliability, we further investigate the impact of
human social relationships on cooperative behaviors, where the nearby devices with
mutual trust can build D2D cooperative relationships. To model D2D cooperation, a
coalition game is first developed, and then we devise a coalition formation algorithm
to construct D2D chains by the bottom to top mode. Simulation results show that
our proposed approach can effectively reduce the average data uploading latency
compared with the state-of-the-art approaches under the real network scenario.
Under the social network scenario, an incentive mechanism is then proposed to
motivate more devices to participate in D2D cooperation, such that data uploading
latency can be reduced and data uploading reliability can be enhanced. With this
incentive mechanism, the nearby devices can obtain rewards such that they are will-
ing to construct a multi-hop D2D chain to assist the other devices in data uploading.
To this end, we adopt coalitional game to formulate D2D chains with careful con-
sideration of social-aware data uploading, where each device acts as a player and
the individual reward is modeled as the utility function. We further design a coali-
tion formation algorithm with merge-and-split rules to determine the solution for the
proposed coalitional game. Extensive simulations are conducted to illustrate that
the performance gain of our incentive mechanism outperforms that of non-incentive
mechanism.
Finally, we summarize our contributions, which can provide the following insights.
Firstly, the data uploading schemes developed in this thesis indicate that by carefully
exploring the device cooperation, human social relationship and incentive mechanism,
a low data uploading latency can be usually achieved while a high data uploading
reliability is ensured. Then, the results obtained in this thesis provide an important
guideline for designing low latency data uploading schemes in D2D-enabled cellular
networks. Finally, we introduce our future works. In this thesis, we consider D2D
cooperation among static devices, one interesting future direction is to further explore
the impact of device mobility on cooperative behaviors. We study how to deliver data
with high-reliability and low-latency, it will be an interesting direction to recruit de-
vices to collect data while satisfying the coverage probability over the field of interest.
We focus on cooperative D2D data uploading in 4G LTE cellular networks, it will
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In this chapter, we first introduce the background of D2D-enabled cellular networks,
and then describe the motivations and contributions of this thesis. Finally, we give
the outline of this thesis.
1.1 Background
With the rapid development of wireless communication technology and the wide pro-
liferation of mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets, the past few years have
witnessed a tremendous growth of mobile applications in wireless systems, e.g., mobile
social media [1], vehicular system [2] and real-time surveillance [3], which pushes the
limits of current 4G cellular technologies. It is predicted by Cisco visual networking
index that, the global mobile data traffic will increase by nearly 15 times from 2014
to 2019, and will take up nearly 75 percent of the world’s mobile data traffic by 2019
[4]. Such explosive growth in these emerging mobile applications and services poses
a significant challenge on the limited frequency resources. Therefore, it is critical for
researchers to better utilize the limited network radio resources by seeking for new
cellular architectures and paradigms.
Compared to current 4G cellular networks, Third Generation Partnership Project
(3GPP) has been developing an enhanced Long Term Evolution (LTE) radio inter-
face called LTE-Advanced (LTE-A). LTE-A radio interface is designed to provide a lot
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of advanced communication techniques for high data rate transmission systems and
mobile data demands, by employing the carrier aggregation massive multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO), millimeter waves, low-power nodes, as well as Device-to-
Device (D2D)communication [5]. Among these LTE-A techniques, D2D communi-
cation is considered as one of the most promising and indispensable component in
next generation cellular technologies, by utilizing the short-range wireless links, to
establish direct connections between mobile devices for data delivery [6–9].
D2D communications underlying cellular networks, which utilizes the same spec-
trum as cellular user (CU), is defined as a direct communication between two mo-
bile devices without traversing cellular infrastructures, whereby under the control
of evolved Node B’s (eNBs), i.e., base station (BS) or core network. Compared to
available communication techniques (e.g., Wi-Fi and Bluetooth), D2D communica-
tion is a very flexible communication technique with unique advantages. Firstly, D2D
devices can enjoy high data rates and low end-to-end delay due to the short range
direct communication. Secondly, it is more spectral efficient for proximate devices
to communicate directly with each other rather than routing through a cellular in-
frastructure. Thirdly, compared to normal downlink/uplink cellular communication,
direct D2D communication saves energy and improves radio resource utilization. Due
to these advancements, it is considered promising in various applications, including
public safety, emergency rescue, cover extension for future 5G networks, disaster re-
sponse, etc.
1.2 Motivations
Motivated by these promising applications of D2D communication, data delivery in
D2D-enabled cellular networks including video multicast [10, 11], data offloading [12–
15], file sharing [16, 17] and data uploading [18] has experienced a massive improve-
ment in the past few years. As illustrated in Figure 1-1, from the Great East Japan
Earthquake and Tsunami [3], we can observe that when the communication infras-
tructures are physically damaged or lack the energy necessary to operate in this real
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disaster situation, we can apply D2D communication to deliver emergent informa-
tion toward the outside and share information among disaster victims in evacuation
centers.
Data uploading, which refers to a certain number of users cooperatively delivering
the photos and videos from the surrounding environment to the control center by
exploiting their carried mobile devices, is a critical issue in D2D-enabled cellular
networks. Various applications have been proposed based on data uploading, traffic
monitoring [19], healthcare [20], public safety [21], and disaster recovery [3]. In such
applications, as the data collected by devices is delay-sensitive, data uploading may
be required to be performed within a specified time frame. In practice, however, little
attention has been paid to latency-aware data uploading. As a consequence, for an
efficient support of mobile applications, it is of great importance to design low-latency
data uploading scheme in D2D-enabled cellular networks.
Extensive research efforts have been devoted to the data uploading study in D2D
enabled cellular networks, which are divided into two cooperative cases: noncooper-
ation and full cooperation. The former focuses on traditional cellular networks with
no cooperative behavior among the devices, where the devices directly deliver their
data to the cellular infrastructure. The data uploading scheme with noncooperation
was investigated in [18, 22–24]. Zhu et al.[22] studied the problem of optimizing the
time for uploading based on the preference measure as well as the cost of the wireless
network available at the time of uploading. Zhang et al.[23] presented MapReduce
framework to minimize the bandwidth cost for uploading deferral big data to a cloud
computing platform. Wang et al.[24] proposed a novel proxy-oriented data uploading
and remote data integrity checking model to solve the security problems in public
cloud environment. Siekkinen et al.[18] studied optimal uploading strategies for live
scalable video transmission from mobile devices. In these works, to deliver data to
the cellular infrastructure, the devices need to have uplink channels with good quali-
ty. That is to say, it is challenging for a device suffering from a poor quality uplink
channel to directly deliver data to the cellular infrastructure with high-reliability and
low-latency.
3
Figure 1-1: Applications of D2D communications in the disaster situations.
In light of this, the data uploading scheme with full cooperation is regarded as one
promising solution to this limitation, where the devices in proximity can build D2D
cooperation so that the device with poor quality uplink channel can select a device
with good quality uplink channel to serve as a relay for data uploading. To carry
out data uploading with full cooperation, a constrained coalition formation game [25]
was introduced to characterize cooperative behavior of self-interested users so that
the data uploading time is reduced. Furthermore, Militano et al.[26] considered social
trust relationships among cooperative users, and then proposed a trust-based D2D
forwarding scheme to construct multi-hop D2D chains from a game-theoretic point
of view.
However, the available studies on data uploading in D2D-enabled cellular networks
suffer from three major limitations. First, D2D cooperation there is only limited to
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devices with uploading data, while the devices without uploading data do not join in
the D2D cooperation, which usually leads to a large data uploading latency. Second,
these studies mainly consider cooperation scenario with full trust where cooperative
devices have full trustworthy relationships with each other, which largely neglects the
effect of human social relationships on the cooperation behaviors and may result in a
low data uploading reliability. Third, these works lack of an incentive mechanism to
stimulate devices to actively participate in the D2D cooperation, which may degrade
the data uploading performances in terms of reliability and latency.
To address the above limitations, this thesis studies the low-latency data upload-
ing in D2D-enabled cellular networks with the help of device cooperation, human
social relationship and incentive mechanism. In this thesis, we made the following
contributions:
• We first propose a generalized cooperative data uploading scheme, which con-
siders D2D cooperation among both the devices with uploading data and the
devices without uploading data, so that the data uploading latency can be re-
duced.
• Considering the data uploading reliability, we further investigate the impact of
human social relationships on cooperative behaviors, where the nearby devices
with mutual trust can build D2D cooperative relationships.
• Under this social network scenario, an incentive mechanism is then proposed
to motivate more devices to participate in the D2D cooperation, such that the
data uploading latency can be reduced and data uploading reliability can be
enhanced.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is outlined as follows:
Chapter 2 Related works. In this chapter, we introduce previous works re-
lated to cooperative D2D data delivery without social-awareness, cooperative D2D
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data delivery with social-awareness and cooperative D2D data delivery with incentive
mechanism.
Chapter 3 Preliminaries. This chapter first gives a system description of co-
operative D2D data uploading underlaying cellular networks, network model, coop-
eration model, communication model, and transmission model. Then, we formulate
the system utility in terms of the data uploading latency. Finally, the main notations
are introduced.
Chapter 4 Generalized cooperative D2D data uploading. In this chap-
ter, we first introduce a coalitional game to formulate the problem of cooperative
D2D data uploading. Based on merge-and-split rules, we then develop a coalition
formation algorithm to obtain the solution for the formulated coalitional game with
convergence on a stable coalitional structure. Extensive simulations demonstrate that
our proposed scheme can reduce the average data uploading latency compared with
other state-of-the-art schemes.
Chapter 5 Social-aware cooperative D2D data uploading. In this chapter,
we first introduce the impact of human social relationships on cooperative behaviors.
Then, a coalition game is adopted to formulate the problem of cooperative D2D data
uploading. Based on the formulated coalition game, we develop a coalition formation
algorithm to construct the D2D cooperation chains by adopting the bottom to top
mode, where the devices with the poor uplink channel quality are first considered
to join D2D cooperation. Simulation results show that our proposed approach can
effectively reduce the average data uploading latency compared with the state-of-the-
art approaches under the real network scenario.
Chapter 6 Social-aware cooperative D2D data uploading with incen-
tive mechanism. In this chapter, we propose an incentive mechanism to motivate
more devices to participate in D2D cooperation. With this incentive mechanism, we
formulate cooperative D2D data uploading with the consideration of human social
relationships as coalitional game, and then we apply merge-and-split rules to devise
a coalition formation algorithm for obtaining formulated coalitional game. Exten-
sive simulations are conducted to illustrate that the performance of our incentive
6
mechanism outperforms that of non-incentive mechanism.
Chapter 7 Conclusion. This chapter concludes the whole thesis by summarizing
our contributions of this thesis, and also discussing potential directions for future
research.
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This chapter introduces the existing works related to our study of the thesis, including
the works on cooperative D2D data delivery without social-awareness, the works on
cooperative D2D data delivery with social-awareness and the works on cooperative
D2D data delivery with incentive mechanism.
2.1 Cooperative D2D Data Delivery without Social-
awareness
A lot of works have been dedicated to the study of cooperative D2D data delivery
without consideration of social-awareness. Available studies mainly focus on either
the case when all devices can help to forward data (full cooperation), or the case when
none of the devices is willing to help in forwarding data (noncooperation). The data
uploading with noncooperation was investigated in [18, 27–29]. In [18], Siekkinen
et al. studied how to optimize content quality using scalable video coding (SVC)
when mobile devices uploaded live multimedia content in cellular networks. In [27],
Wang et al. proposed an energy-efficient and cost-effective data uploading framework
named effSense, which adopted a distributed decision making scheme to minimize
both energy consumption and data cost caused by data uploading in cellular networks.
In [28, 29], different privacy preserving mechanisms for data uploading phase were
9
designed to capture the privacy inference threat encountered by mobile devices while
considering data quality requirements and energy conservation, respectively. In these
works, to upload data to the cellular infrastructure, the devices need to have uplink
channels with good quality. That is to say, it is challenging for a device suffering from
a poor quality uplink channel to directly upload data to the cellular infrastructure
with high-reliability and low-latency.
Later, the data uploading with full cooperation was investigated in [25, 30–34],
where the devices in proximity can build D2D cooperation so that the device with poor
quality uplink channel can select a device with good quality uplink channel to serve
as a relay for data uploading. In [30], the users studied the joint channel and pow-
er allocation problem for D2D communications underlaying uplink cellular networks
using a Stackelberg game, which aims to maximize the sum-rate of D2D communi-
cations while fulfilling the QoS requirements for both cellular users (CUs) and D2D
pairs (DUs). In [31], the authors proposed an interference coordination/management
strategy based D2D-management and designed an appropriately power control algo-
rithm for mitigating the above-mentioned interference. The works [32–34] addressed
the resource allocation problem for multiple D2D and cellular users using different
theory methods (i.e., game theory and stochastic geometry). In addition, the authors
[25] studied how to construct multi-hop D2D chain for data uploading from a game
theoretical point of view, and designed the coalition formation algorithm to reduce
the data uploading time.
In these schemes, D2D cooperation is only limited to devices with uploading data,
while the devices without uploading data do not participate in D2D cooperation.
To have an efficient data uploading, we propose a more generalized data uploading
scheme where D2D cooperation applies to both devices with uploading data and
devices without uploading data, such that the data uploading latency can be reduced.
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2.2 Cooperative D2D Data Delivery with Social-
awareness
Currently, data delivery has recently drawn great attention from the wireless research
community. Most existing literatures mainly focus on cooperative D2D data delivery
without the consideration of social-awareness, where these studies assume that co-
operative devices have completely trustworthy relationships with each other and the
collected data can be reliably delivered to the control center by D2D collaboration,
which is not realistic in reality. Practical devices may expose themselves to potential
privacy threats due to collaboration with unfamiliar devices. In addition, these de-
vices may deliberately fabricate erroneous and malicious message to interrupt data
delivery. As a result, it is desirable to provide safety-efficient data delivery while
taking the trustworthiness among the devices into account.
With the explosive growth of online social networks such as Facebook and Twitter,
more and more people are actively involved in online social interactions. Since mobile
devices are carried by human beings, and social relationship (e.g., kinship, friendship
and colleague relationship) among human beings can be utilized to achieve effective
and trustworthy assistance for data delivery among the mobile devices. Here, social
relationships among human beings contain two key social phenomena: social trust
and social reciprocity. In social trust, it can be built up among humans such as
kinship, friendship, colleague relationship, and altruistic behaviors are observed in
many human activities [35]. Another key social phenomenon [36], social reciprocity
is a powerful social paradigm to promote cooperation so that a group of individuals
without social trust can exchange mutually beneficial actions, making all of them
better off. By leveraging social relationship among human beings, this has opened
up a new avenue for cooperative D2D data delivery system design.
Recently, there has been some studies on cooperative D2D data delivery with
consideration of social relationship, e.g., social-aware video multicast [37], social da-
ta offloading(downloading) [12, 38], social-aware information exchange [39, 40], and
social-aware data dissemination [17]. To meet the explosive demand on delivering
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high-definition video steams over cellular networks, Cao et al [37] designed a Social-
aware video multiCast (SoCast) system leveraging D2D communications, which can
stimulate effective cooperation among mobile users (clients), by making use of two
types of important social ties, i.e., social trust and social reciprocity. In [12, 38],
the authors improved packet transmission and reduced the load on the network’s in-
frastructure by exploiting the social network characteristics. The literature [39, 40]
exploited social ties in human social networks to enhance the information exchange
with nearby devices in D2D communications. The work in [17] proposed a three-
phase approach for D2D data dissemination, which exploited social-awareness and
opportunistic contacts with user mobility.
We note that the available works mainly focus on social-aware multicast, offload-
ing, information exchange and dissemination, while limited works consider the prob-
lem of social-aware data uploading. Considering the data uploading reliability, this
thesis investigates the impact of human social relationships on cooperative behaviors,
where the nearby devices with mutual trust can build D2D cooperative relationships.
2.3 Cooperative D2D Data Delivery with Incen-
tive Mechanism
Although many applications and systems on cooperative D2D data delivery have
been developed. Unfortunately, most of them assume that mobile devices would
participate in cooperative D2D data delivery voluntarily, which is not true in reality.
Mobile devices are generally reluctant to assist other devices or coalitions without
getting payment. The major reasons account for mobile devices being reluctant.
When assisting other devices or coalitions for data delivery, the devices will consume
their own resources, such as power, memory, time, and wireless channel resources.
Thus, it is of paramount importance for cooperative D2D data delivery to provide
effective incentive mechanisms.
A couple of incentive mechanisms have been proposed for data delivery in D2D
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enhanced cellular networks [41–45]. In [41], Wang et al. studied the problem of
resource allocation for D2D communications underlaying cellular networks by ex-
ploiting social ties in human-formed social networks, which aims to enhance the data
transmission size of each coalition. Further, a social-community-aware D2D resource
allocation framework was proposed, where the devices established D2D cooperative
relationships with each other to maximize the community’s payoff. Then, Yi et al.
[42] studied a social-aware D2D offloading framework, and proposed an efficient re-
source management and incentive mechanism for social-aware D2D content sharing
with proactive caching, which objective is to effectively offload cellular traffic and
significantly improve system’s energy and spectral efficiency. Later, Ning et al. [43]
focused on the incorporation of incentive stimulations into data dissemination in au-
tonomous mobile social networks with selfish nodes and multiple interest data types,
which goal is to disseminate data messages to corresponding sinks with both delay
and traffic overhead as low as possible. Finally, the works of [44, 45] considered a
cooperative sensing system, where the users choose a set of tasks to participate in
and then cooperatively deliver data to the BS. To motivate more users to participate
in the sensing task, these works designed an incentive mechanism to maximize the
users’ profits.
Though incentive mechanisms on cooperative D2D data delivery in these works
were developed, few works has paid enough attention to the incentive mechanisms
on cooperative D2D data uploading. Motivated by this important observation, this
thesis proposes an incentive mechanism to motivate more devices to participate in
the D2D cooperation, such that the data uploading latency can be reduced and data
uploading reliability can be enhanced. With this incentive mechanism, the nearby
devices can obtain rewards such that they are willing to construct a multi-hop D2D
chain to assist the other devices in data uploading.
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In this chapter, we first introduce the system models of data uploading in D2D-
enabled cellular networks, regarding network model, cooperation model, communi-
cation model, and transmission model. Then we formulate the system utility of
cooperative D2D data uploading in terms of the data uploading latency. Finally, the
main notations involved in this thesis.
3.1 System Models
3.1.1 Network Model
As depicted in Figure 3-1, we focus on a single cell in the Long Term Evolution
Advanced (LTE-A) involving N mobile devices, denoted by the set N = {1, 2, ..., N},
under its coverage. In LTE-A cell, multiple devices, labelled as M = {1, 2, ...,M}
with M ⊂ N and M ≤ N , need to upload data to the BS. Besides, these devices
from setM are allocated orthogonal radio resources by the BS according to Maximum
Throughput (MT) scheduling policy proposed in [25] and such an operation can be
done before data uploading. Here, the BS collects the information of Channel Quality
Indicators (CQIs) on each device-to-BS uplink, and then calculates and distributes
the orthogonal resources to the devices in setM in an ascending order according to
their uplink CQI.
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Figure 3-1: System of cooperative D2D data uploading.
3.1.2 Cooperation Model
In such a network scenario, when any two devices are within mutual communication
range, the feasible cooperative relationships can be established. Taking such physical
constraint into account, we introduce the physical cooperative graph Gp = {V p, εp}
[39] to describe cooperative relationships among the devices. Here V p is the set of
vertices to denote the set of devices, and εp = {(uv) : epuv = 1,∀u, v ∈ N} is the set
of edge, where epuv = 1 if and only if device u and device v are within communication
range. Based on GP , each vertex (i.e., device) u can build its physical cooperative
database N pu = {v : epuv = 1,∀v ∈ N}, which contains all cooperative candidates for
device u.
To obtain the physical cooperative database N pu for a device u ∈ N , we perform
the ad hoc peer discovery [38] before establishing D2D communication, where device
u periodically broadcasts a randomized probing beacon containing its ID and other
information to the devices within D2D communication range. Once the other device
receives the probing beacon, it will send feedback message that attaches its ID and
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other information to device u. Through a feedback process, the device u can obtain
a list of cooperative candidates.
3.1.3 Communication Model
Taking the physical cooperative database into consideration, the devices can cooper-
ate to construct multi-hop D2D chains for data uploading. As an illustration of the
formed chains shown in Figure 3-1, all devices can form 3 multi-hop chains based on
D2D cooperation. To form each chain, e.g., chain 1, device 6 chooses a feasible device
1 to serve as the relay for data uploading, and then the chosen device 1 continues to
seek the next optimal relay 8 until no feasible device can help the current device 8.
As such, a stable multi-hop chain 1 is formed. For each formed chain, the devices can
be classified into three types: source device, relay device and head device. The source
device (e.g.,device 6) at the bottom of the chain only transmits its own generated
data to the next device (e.g.,device 1) in the chain. The head device (e.g.,device
8) is in charge of uploading all data of the chain to the BS. All remaining devices
(e.g.,device 1) in the chain are regarded as relay devices, which are used for receiving
data from the former devices, and then relaying data (its own and received one) to
the next devices in the chain.
In the formulated D2D chains, we assume that the devices from the different
chains are assigned with orthogonal resources to avoid mutual interference. In order
to maximize the system performance [32], the devices from the same chain adopt time
division duplex (TDD) mode [46] to share all radio resources of the chain, where the
resource block (RB) is the smallest allocated unit. As depicted in Figure 3-2, it is
divided into 12 consecutive sub-carriers occupying 180kHz in the frequency domain,
whereas it spans for 10 ms and consists of 10 subframes lasting 1 ms or 20 time slots
duration of 0.5 ms in the time domain.
However, the above allocated mode may lead to mutual interference for the de-
vices in the same chain, and thus we consider two extreme cases to avoid mutual
interference, i.e., best case and worst case. The former corresponds to that there is
no interference among devices from the same coalition, so the same radio resource
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Figure 3-2: TDD (Time Division Duplex) frame structure.
can be shared by those devices. The latter represents that interference exists among
devices from the same coalition, and thus those devices can only utilize the resources
allocated to them in advance. In TDD mode, we adopt the type 2 configuration 0
LTE frame structure [47], which consists of ten sub-frames lasting for 1 ms in which
six sub-frames are used for data uploading.
3.1.4 Transmission Model
In each TDD uplink sub-frame, we adopt the half-duplex mode [48] to describe co-
operative behavior among the devices, in which the device may either deliver data to
the subsequent device from the same chain or receive data from the former device in
the same chain. Moreover, we apply the decode-and-forward (DF) protocol [49] to
describe the transmission behavior of the devices. When the device transmits data to
the subsequent device from the same chain, it first transmits its own generated data,
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and then transmits the received data from the previous device of the same chain.
In addition, in a given uplink sub-frame, we sort all devices from the same chain
with a numerical order, and consider a reasonable assumption for these devices, where
if the devices from even positions of the same chain transmit data to next devices
of the chain simultaneously, the devices from odd positions of the same chain will
receive data from the previous devices of the chain at the same time. Similarly, when
the even devices transmit data, the odd devices will receive data in a given sub-frame.
3.2 Problem Formulation
In formed D2D chains, the data is uploaded to the BS by leveraging two modes, i.e.,
cellular transmission mode and D2D transmission mode. In the former transmission
mode, the data is directly transmitted by the device to the BS, whereas the data is
transmitted between two different devices in the latter transmission mode. In the
following, we first calculate data rate of each device under the above two transmis-
sion modes. With the calculated data rate, we then formulate the system utility of
cooperative D2D data uploading in terms of the data uploading latency.
3.2.1 Data Rate Calculation
For cellular transmission mode, to calculate data rate of a device u ∈ M, we first
compute the power received by the BS on the link between device u and the BS,
denoted by s, say u → s, and then calculate the signal to interference plus noise
ratio (SINR) on link u→ s, which is considered as the CQI of device u. Finally, the
expression of data rate of device u is given. According to the free space propagation
loss model [50], the received power Pu,s by the BS on the link u→ s is written as
Pu,s = P
c
u · d−au,s · |hu,s|2, (3.1)
where a is the path loss compensation factor, du,s is the distance between device u
and the BS, P cu is the transmitted power of device u in cellular transmission mode,
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and hu,s is the channel coefficient of link u → s. In our work, we model the uplink
channel of the device as the Rayleigh fading channel [32]. Therefore, the channel
coefficient hu,s follows the independent complex Gaussian distribution CN (0, 1) [51].
With the received power Pu,s, we then calculate the SINR γu,s on link u → s,
which can be expressed by
γu,s =
P cu · d−au,s · |hu,s|2
Pint,s +N0
, (3.2)
where Pint,s represents the interference signal power, which is obtained by the BS
and decided by the transmitted power of D2D devices assigned by the same radio
resources with device u [32]. N0 represents the thermal noise density level received
by the BS.
After obtaining the SINR γu,s, we finally calculate the data rate r
c
u of device u in
the cellular transmission mode, which is decided by Shannon’s capacity formula [52]
as follows
rcu = Bu · log2(1 +
P cu · d−αu,s · |hu,s|2
Pint,s +N0
), (3.3)
where Bu is the radio resource of device u.
Considering D2D transmission mode, we consider that device u transmits data
to the BS by device v ∈ Nu. Similar to the data rate calculation method in cellular
transmission mode, we first calculate the received power by device v on link u → v,
and then calculate SINR on link u → v. Finally, the expression of the data rate of
device u, denoted by rdu, is given by
rdu = Bu · log2(1 +
P du · d−αu,v · |hu,v|2
Pint,v +N0
), (3.4)
where P du represents the transmitted power of device u in the D2D transmission mode.
hu,v and du,v represent the channel coefficient and the distance between device u and
v, respectively. Pint,v represents the interference signal power received by device v,
which is determined by the transmitted power from D2D devices and cellular devices
20
that are assigned the same radio resources with device u [32].
3.2.2 Data Uploading Latency Calculation
Based on the above calculated data rate, we derive the expression of the data upload-
ing latency, which is first defined as follows [53].
Data Uploading latency: For any device, the data uploading latency is defined
as the time duration from the time slot when the device starts to deliver the data
packet to the time slot when the BS has received the data packet.
To calculate the data uploading latency from any device u ∈ M, we take chain
S with l devices as an example where 1 ≤ l ≤ N and u ∈ S. In chain S, the source
device is considered as the first node (i.e., u = 1) and the head device is regarded as
the last node (i.e., u = l), and we assume that device u needs to transmit a certain
amount of data, denoted by bu ≥ 0, to the BS. According to calculation method of
the channel occupation time in [25], we calculate the data uploading latency tu(S) of
device u in chain S, which is expressed by













where l = 1 represents that device u delivers data to the BS separately.
Then, the total data uploading latency T (S) of chain S, which represents the sum
of the data uploading latency of all devices in chain S, is given by













Similar to the calculation method of T (S), we then calculate the total data up-
loading latency T (S1), T (S2), ..., T (Sk) of other chains S1, S2, ..., Sk. Considered the
number of devices in different chains, i.e., |S1|, |S2|, ..., |Sk|, the expression of the
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average data uploading latency, denoted by Tave, is given by
Tave =
T (S1) + T (S2) + ...+ T (S)...+ T (Sk)
|S1|+ |S2|+ ...+ |S|...+ |Sk|
. (3.7)
In this paper, our objective is to construct multi-hop chains for data uploading
by D2D cooperation so that the average data uploading latency is reduced. Thus,
we formulate the problem of cooperative D2D data uploading for cellular networks as
low-latency data uploading (LLDU) problem, which is described as follows:






0 < |Si| ≤ N and 1 ≤ i ≤ k;|S1|+ |S2|+ ...+ |Sk| = N. (3.8)
3.3 Notations
The main notations of this thesis are summarized in Table 3.1 and 3.2.
Table 3.1: Main notations
Symbol Definition
N = {1, 2, ..., N} The set of all devices, where N is the number of the devices.
M = {1, 2, ...,M} The set of the devices with uploading data, whereM⊂ N .
Gp = {V p, εp} The physical cooperative graph, where V p is the set of ver-
tices, and εp is the set of edge.
εp = {(uv) : epuv = 1} The cooperative relationship of devices u, v, where epuv = 1
means that device u, v are within communication range.
N pu The physical cooperative database of device u.
Gs = {V s, εs} The social trust graph, where V s is the set of vertices, and
εs is the set of edge.
εs = {(uv) : esuv = P s} The social relationship of devices u and v, where esuv = 1
implies that device u and v have trustworthy relationship.
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N su The social trust database of device u.
G = {V, ε} The physical-social graph, V is the set of vertices, and ε is
the set of edge.
ε = {(uv) : euv = 1} The physical-social relationship of devices u and v, where
euv = e
s
uv·epuv = 1 implies that device u and v have the trust-
based relationship and are within communicate range.
Nu The cooperative database of device u.
Pu,s The received power by the BS on the link u→ s.
a The path loss compensation factor.
du,s The distance between device u and the BS.
P cu The transmitted power of device u in cellular transmission
mode.
hu,s The channel coefficient of link u→ s.
γu,s The SINR on link u→ s.
Pint,s The interference signal power received by the BS.
N0 The thermal noise density level received by the BS.
rcu The data rate of device u in the cellular transmission mode.
rdu The data rate of device u in D2D transmission mode.
P du The transmitted power of device u in the D2D transmission
mode.
hu,v The channel coefficient between device u and v.
du,v The distance between device u and v.
Pint,v The interference signal power received by device v.
tu(S) The data uploading latency of device u in chain S.
T (S) The total data uploading latency of chain S.
Tave The average data uploading latency of all devices.
∆tu(S) The reduced latency of device u assisting other devices of
chain S for data uploading.
Ω = {N ,XN ,V} The coalitional game. N is the set of players, XN is the set
of cooperative strategies, V is the characteristic function.
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λ The scaling factor which describes the incentive intensity.
α The scaling factor which describes the incentive intensity.
β The scaling factor which describes the incentive intensity.
bu The data amount of device u.
C(S) The sum of reward received by all devices in chain S.
B = {B1, B2, ..., BM} The resource set of M devices.
C = {c1, c2, ..., cN} The reward set from the devices.
x = {x1, x2, ..., xN} The sets of individual payoffs.
S = {S1, S2, ..., Sk} A coalitional structure (or a partition) of N .
A = {A1, A2, ...Al} A partition of any coalition.
d The maximum communication distance.
su(S) The data uploading reliability of device u ∈ S.
Ps The probability of social relationship between any pair of
devices.
N(µ, σ) The normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ.
CN The independent complex Gaussian distribution.
t0 The tolerable latency t0.
eu(S) The energy consumption of device u in chain S.
s0 The tolerable reliability s0.
◃ The preference order.
7 The opposite rule of the preference order ◃.
Table 3.2: Main variables
Notation Definition
k The number of coalitions.
F = {F1, F2, ...FN} The flag of all devices.
f The cycle count.
i The cycle count.
V The set of selected devices.
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Bsum The total resources.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced the system models of cooperative D2D data uploading
for cellular networks, including network model, cooperation model, communication
model, and transmission model. Then we calculated the data rate of each device
under cellular transmission mode and D2D transmission mode. With the calculated
data rate, we formulated the system utility in terms of the data uploading latency.
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In this chapter, we propose a generalized cooperative data uploading scheme which
considers D2D cooperation among both the devices with and without uploading data,
so that the data uploading latency can be reduced. This scheme covers the conven-
tional schemes where D2D cooperation is only limited to devices with uploading data
as special cases. In this scheme, to motivate D2D cooperation among all available de-
vices, we organize the devices within communication range by offering them rewards
to construct multi-hop D2D chains for data uploading. Specifically, we formulate the
problem of chain formation among the devices for data uploading as a coalitional
game. Based on merge-and-split rules, we develop a coalition formation algorithm to
obtain the solution for the formulated coalitional game with convergence on a stable
coalitional structure. Finally, extensive numerical results show the effectiveness of
our proposed scheme in reducing the average data uploading latency.
4.1 Coalitional Game Formulation
In this section, we introduce a coalitional game to address the problem of D2D chain
formation for data uploading, so that the data uploading latency is reduced. Here,
coalitional game formulation for cooperative D2D data uploading is firstly presented,
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and then we analyze two critical properties of our formulated coalition game in terms
of the characteristic form and the superadditivity.
4.1.1 NTU Coalitional Game
In our work, we cast the problem of D2D chain formation as a nontransferable utility
(NTU) coalitional game [54], which is described as follows:
Definition 1 : The coalitional game with a nontransferable utility is defined by
the pair (N ,V), in which N is the set of players, and V is a characteristic function
which is defined on the coalition S ⊆ N , where V(S) ⊆ R|S| and V(ϕ) = ϕ. V(S)
represents a set of payoff vectors x(S) of all players in coalition S, where every element
xu(S) ∈ x(S) is a payoff received by player u ∈ S through the feasible cooperation
with other players of coalition S.
Remark 1 : Considering the selfishness of human beings, the devices carried by
human beings only consider their individual payoff rather than the coalitional payoff
while participating in D2D cooperation for data uploading. Thus, we adopt game the-
ory to formulate the problem of cooperative D2D data uploading, which can maximize
the individual payoff.
In our concerned coalitional game, the players in set N correspond to all devices
in our deployed cell, and each payoff xu(S) in the payoff vectors x(S) is measured by
the reward cu(S) received by device u in chain S. For any device u ∈ S, its reward
cu(S) is proportional to the reduced latency ∆tu(S) created by device u assisting
other devices in S for data uploading, and then is given by
cu(S) = λ∆tu(S), (4.1)
where λ > 0 is a scaling factor and it is used for describing the incentive intensity.
To calculate the reduced latency ∆tu(S), we consider that there have been u− 1
devices in chain S before the uth device participates in chain S, and the total data
uploading latency of chain S is determined as T ′(S) according to formula 3.6. After
the uth device participating in chain S, the total data uploading latency of chain S
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is determined by T (S) according to formula 3.6. Then the reduced latency ∆tu(S)




















Remark 2 : Notice that each device consumes its own resources (e.g., time, energy,
and memory) when assisting other devices or coalitions for data uploading, and thus
it is often reluctant to assist other devices or coalitions in data uploading without
getting payment, especially for the devices without uploading data. To encourage all
available devices to cooperate with each other, we propose a new incentive mechanism,
which is similar to that of [43, 45, 55]. In this mechanism, if the device u with u ∈ N
can assist other devices or coalitions in data uploading and the data uploading latency
of the assisted devices or coalitions can be reduced, the device u will earn a payment
(e.g., credit, penalties, etc.), which is determined by the reduced latency for assisted
devices or coalitions.
4.1.2 Property Analysis
Our concerned coalitional game relates to two essential properties: the characteristic
form and the superadditivity [56]. For the characteristic form, the payoff vectors of
the players in coalition S only depend on the feasible cooperations among all players
in coalition S, with no dependence on other devices out of coalition S. Besides, the
form of our concerned coalitional game is the characteristic form, which is due to the
fact that the devices in the same coalition can construct a D2D chain, whereas the
devices in different coalitions do not establish any cooperation. Another key property
is the superadditivity, which is described as follows.
Definition 2 : A NTU coalitional game (N ,V) is superadditive if any coalitions
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S1, S2 ⊂ N with S1 ∩ S2 = ϕ satisfy the following condition
V(S1 ∪ S2) ⊃ {x(S1 ∪ S2) ∈ R|S1∪S2||
xu(S1) ∈ V(S1), xv(S2) ∈ V(S2)},
(4.3)
where x is a payoff vector of all devices from coalitions S1 and S2. If the condition of
superadditivity holds, D2D cooperation among the devices is always beneficial, and
thus the players can form the grand coalition due to individual payoff improvements,
where all players are in a coalition. Then the following theorem holds.
Theorem 1 : Our concerned coalitional game is nonsuperadditive.
Proof: We consider any two formed coalitions S1, S2 ⊂ N with S1 ∩ S2 = ϕ and
their corresponding payoff vectors x(S1) and x(S2) when they do not cooperate with
each other. We assume that the devices in coalitions S1 and S2 share resources of
coalitions S1 and S2, respectively. Furthermore, we assume that there exists interfer-
ence among the devices between coalitions S1 and S2. Assume that coalitions S1 and
S2 form coalition S1∪S2, we can obtain cu(S1∪S2) < cu(S1),∀u ∈ S1 and cv(S1∪S2) <
cv(S2), ∀v ∈ S2 according to 4.1. As a result, the payoff xu(S1∪S2) < xu(S1),∀u ∈ S1
and xv(S1 ∪ S2) < xv(S2), ∀v ∈ S2 hold, which contradicts with the definition of
superadditivity. Thus, our concerned coalitional game is nonsuperadditive.
Due to the nonsuperadditive, the grand coalition seldom forms. On the contrary,
independent disjoint coalitions may form. Thus, we develop coalition formation algo-
rithm to find independent and disjoint coalitions.
4.2 Coalition Formation Algorithm
In this subsection, we first introduce coalition formation theory, which is used for an-
alyzing how to formulate independent disjoint coalitions, and then develop a merge-
and-split formation algorithm to construct the multi-hop D2D chains. Finally, we
analyse the property of stability and computational complexity for the proposed coali-
tion formation algorithm.
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4.2.1 Coalition Formation Theory
Coalition formation theory [56] is an important research direction in coalitional game.
It mainly analyzes the formation of coalitional structure when the grand coalition
does not form. To derive a feasible coalitional structure, we first give the concept
of coalitional collection S, which is defined as S = {S1, S2, ..., Sk} with Si ⊂ N and
Si ∩ Sj = ϕ for i ̸= j. If condition
∪k
i=1 Si = N holds, the collection S is regarded as
a coalitional structure (or a partition) of N .
Finding a feasible coalitional structure inN by exhaustive traverse of all partitions
of N is not feasible and impractical, due to the fact that the number of partitions of
N increases exponentially with the number of devices of N and is regarded as the Bell
number [57], which makes this problem into a NP-complete problem [58]. To derive
the optimal coalitional structure, the merge-and-split rules [59] are introduced, where
the players from N leave or join a coalition according to the preference order [59].
Definition 3 : A preference order ◃ is defined for comparing two collections S ′ =
{S ′1, S ′2, ..., S ′l} and S = {S1, S2, ..., Sk}, which are two partitions for the same subset
A ⊆ N . If S ◃ S ′, it implies that partition S of A is preferable to partition S ′ of A.
A variety of well-known orders can be used as the preference order [59], where
the Pareto order [59] considers the individual payoff of each player, and thus we
utilize the Pareto order as the preference order. To define the Pareto order, we set
two collections S and S ′ as a partition of N , where the sets of individual payoffs
x = {x1, x2, ..., xN} and x’ = {x′1, x′2, ...x′N} are resulted from collections S and S ′,
respectively. Then the definition of the Pareto order is given by
S ◃ S ′ ⇔ {xu ≥ x′u, ∀u ∈ N and xu > x′u, ∃u ∈ N} (4.4)
This definition means that collection S outperforms collection S ′ if at least one
player can obtain a payoff improvement without reducing other players’ payoff when
coalitional structure changes from collection S ′ to collection S. With the defined
preference order, we give the concept of merge-and-split rules [59], which are defined
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as follows.
• Merge Rule: Merge any set of coalitions {S1, S2, ..., Sk} into a single new coali-
tion S ′ =
∪k
i=1 Si, if S
′ ◃ {S1, S2, ..., Sk}.
• Split Rule: Split any coalition S ′ into multiple new coalitions {S1, S2, ..., Sk}, if
{S1, S2, ..., Sk} ◃ S ′, where S ′ =
∪k
i=1 Si.
The merge rule means that coalitions will merge only if the merge operation can
improve the individual payoff of at least one player while other players’ payoffs do
not be decreased. Similarly, the split rule means that any coalition will split only if
at least one player can obtain an improvement for individual payoff through the split
operation, whereas other players do not suffer the payoffs reduction.
4.2.2 Merge-and-Split Algorithm
With the defined merge-and-split rules, we develop a coalition formation algo-
rithm to implement the formulated coalitional game, as described in Algorithm 1.
By starting from the set of noncooperative devices N ,M and cooperative database
N pu , u ∈ N , we construct a stable coalitional structure Sfin = {S1, S2, ..., Sk} to re-
duce the data uploading latency. In this algorithm, we first initialize the coalition
index i, the cycle count f , the set of selected devices V , the reward set C, and apply
MT scheduling policy to allocate the resources to the M devices from lines 1-4. Then
in line 5, we sort the devices of setM in an ascending order according to their uplink
CQI. Through the efficient D2D cooperation among nearby devices, we sequentially
search for all feasible coalitions (S1, S2, ..., Sk) from lines 6 − 33. To construct each
coalition Si with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we first select a device u ∈M, which does not participate
in D2D cooperation (i.e., u /∈ V ) and set it as the first device of coalition Si (i.e.,
Si = {u}) in line 7. Then from lines 8 to 31, we iteratively select next device v for
the current device u from N pu ̸= ϕ.
In each iteration, we first sort the devices from set N pu in a descending order
according to their D2D CQI in line 9, and then select device v from set N pu based
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on merge and split operations from lines 10-30. If the selected device v does not
participate in D2D cooperation, we execute Procedure 1 to evaluate if the merge
operation of v and Si can improve the individual payoff of at least one device, while
other devices’ payoffs do not decrease. In Procedure 1, the merge operations of both
cases (i.e., best case and worst case) are considered. For the best case, we calculate
the total resources Bsum in formulated coalition Si ∪ {v}, and then set the resources
Bj = Bsum for device j ∈ Si ∪ {v}. Based on formula 4.1, we calculate the reward
cv(Si∪{v}) received by device v in coalition Si∪{v}, and make a comparison between
cv(Si ∪ {v}) and cv. In the worst case, device v can utilize the resources allocated
to them in advance. Similar to the operation of the best case, we calculate the
reward cv(Si ∪ {v}) of device v, and then compare the reward cv(Si ∪ {v}) and cv.
If {Si ∪ {v}} ◃ {{v}, Si}, we join device v into coalition Si and update the reward of
device v. Then, we set v as the current device of Si and go to step 8 to select the
next device of device v.
If the selected device v has involved in another coalition, we traverse all formed
coalitions to search for coalition Si′ with v ∈ Si′ , which consists of two coalitions
Si′1 and Si′2 with v ∈ Si′2, v /∈ Si′1 by taking into account v as the threshold device,
and then execute Procedure 2 to evaluate if the formed coalition Si′ can split. In
Procedure 2, we consider the split operation of both case (i.e., best case and worst
case). For the best case, we calculate the total resources Bsum in formulated coalition
Si′2∪Si, and then set the resources Bj = Bsum of device j ∈ Si′2∪Si. Based on formula
4.1, we calculate the reward cj(Si′2 ∪ Si) received by device j with j ∈ Si′2 ∪ Si, and
make a comparison between the reward cj(Si′2 ∪ Si) and cj for device ∀j ∈ Si′2 ∪ Si.
In the worst case, the devices j ∈ Si′2 ∪ Si can utilize the resources allocated to
them in advance. Similar to the operation of the best case, we calculate the reward
cj(Si′2∪Si) of device j ∈ Si′2∪Si, and then compare the reward cj(Si′2∪Si) and cj of
device j ∈ Si′2 ∪ Si. If {Si′1, Si′2 ∪ Si} ◃ {Si′ , Si}, we split coalition Si′ into coalitions
Si′1, v /∈ Si′1 and Si′2, v ∈ Si′2 by taking v as the threshold device, and then merge
coalitions Si and Si′2 into coalition Si. Finally, we update the rewards of all devices
in coalition Si, and search for the next device in current coalition Si′1 by jumping
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into step 8. The iteration procedure repeats until no feasible device v ∈ N pu can help
device u (i.e., f = |N pu |), and then coalition Si forms. Once coalition Si forms, we
search for the next coalition Si++. After finishing the loop from lines 6− 33, we can
obtain a stable coalitional structure Sfin.
Remark 3 : Notice that the proposed coalition formation algorithm is implemented
by the BS in the centralized manner, which is similar to that of [60]. Preliminarily,
the BS collects all the required information about channel gains, traffic demand, and
the device SINRs of both cellular and D2D links, and then calculates and distributes
the resources to the devices with uploading data according to MT scheduling policy.
Moreover, a merge and split coalition formation algorithm is executed under the
assistant of the BS, which is summarized in Algorithm 1. In Algorithm 1, each device
first performs peer discovery to obtain cooperative candidates, and then constructs
multi-hop D2D chains by D2D cooperation with cooperative candidates. When the
stable coalitional structure Sfin = {S1, S2, ..., Sk} forms, the BS will be in charge of
propagating the message of coalitional structure to all devices using the channel-aware
random access manner, which has been adopted in [38]. Under the execution process,
the head device of each coalition first sends the collected message of coalition (i.e.,
device number, device ID, and device location) to the BS, and then the BS broadcasts
the received message to all devices over the channel via a random access manner.
Finally, through the formulated paths, the devices apply the half-duplex decode-and-
forward (DF) relaying protocol to transmit data to the BS. The information overhead
for the centralized algorithm [60] is realistic for a small or medium-sized network
in which changes in traffic demand are not very fast. In our proposed centralized
algorithm, the information overhead involves three parts (i.e., collecting the required
information, allocating the resource and sending the algorithm message), and the
amount of the overhead depends on the size of our deployed network that is very
small. Therefore, the information overhead of Algorithm 1 can be restricted to a
tolerable level for a practical system.
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4.2.3 Algorithm Analysis
In this subsection, we analyse the property of stability and computational complexity
for the proposed coalition formation algorithm. Firstly, our proposed algorithm con-
verge to a stable coalitional structure which consists of disjoint coalitions (the proof
of stability is similar to that in the works [41], [61]).
Then, we analyze the other property of our proposed algorithm, i.e., computational
complexity, which is decided by the number of merge-and-split iteration operations
in Algorithm 1. In this Algorithm, to search the number of all feasible coalitions
from lines 6 to 33, the iteration is executed at most M times in the worst case, i.e.,
M devices with uploading data form M singleton coalitions. From lines 8 to 31,
as we require to search all devices from the set N to construct a coalition in the
worst case, the complexity of this operation is at most N . In addition, to select
the cooperative device for each device u, the time of iteration from lines 10 to 30
is at most |N pu |. The reason is that device u has at most |N pu | feasible cooperative
devices within its communication range, and thus device u requires to make |N pu |
attempts to guarantee the maximum cooperation in the worst case. As a result, the
computational complexity of Algorithm 1 is at most O(M ×N ×|N pu |). Furthermore,
since M ≤ N and |N pu | ≤ N . Thus, our proposed coalition formation algorithm has
a computational complexity of O(N3).
Remark 4 : Notice that in our proposed algorithm, the computational complexity
is determined by the number of iteration of merge-and-split operations. For the merge
operation, each device needs to make the merge attempts with other devices in N for
guaranteeing the maximum cooperation, and thus the number of merge operations
will be O(N3) in the worst case. For the split operation, it involves finding all possible
partitions of the formed coalitions, and thus splitting a coalition S requires to make
O(2|S|) attempts in the worst case, which is restricted to the size of the formed
coalitions. In practice, due to the limitation of D2D communication range, the size of
the formed coalitions is quite small, and thus the complexity of the split operation can
be neglected. As a result, our proposed algorithm has a computational complexity of
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O(N3). Compared to the conventional works [25, 51] that apply the merge-and-split
rules to implement coalition formation algorithm, the computational complexity of
our proposed algorithm is at the same level with that of [25, 51].
4.3 Numerical Results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed generalized data up-
loading scheme. The evaluating settings, the impact of D2D cooperation and the
performance comparison with other uploading scheme are presented as follows.
4.3.1 Evaluating Settings
In the performance evaluations, we carry out the simulations in a network scenario of
disaster recovery communication (e.g., earthquake, hurricane or flood) that has been
widely adopted in previous studies [3, 62, 63], where power failures and damaged
communication infrastructures caused by disasters leave the affected area cut off from
the outside and hinder the rescue operations. To accelerate rescue operations, the
devices of trapped survivors that are unable to move need to send out the amount of
message from surrounding environments to rescue crews, even with best effort service
and even without acknowledgment.
In the network simulation, we consider a 1000 m × 1000 m square area with the
BS in the center, where N devices within the number range of 0 ∼ 50 are randomly
scattered within the coverage of the BS, and M ≤ N devices are willing to upload
data to the BS. To derive the amount of uploaded data of M devices, we adopt the
real datasets from [64] that matches the practical network scenarios, where the up-
loaded data is comprised of a lot of video clips and the video file size corresponds to
the amount of uploaded data. In addition, we assume that the locations of all devices
fix during a D2D communication scheduling period, and the maximum communica-
tion distance between arbitrary two devices is set as d = 100 m. We execute 500
simulations, and then the data uploading latency is obtained by the average of all
simulation results.
36
The main parameters used in our simulation are described as follows: we consider
a 10 MHz spectrum band shared by the devices under cellular transmission mode
and D2D transmission mode that operate at 2.5 GHz carrier frequency. For cellular
transmission model, the transmission power P cu for any device u is set as 23 dbm,
whereas its transmission power P du is set as −19 dbm in D2D transmission model.
In particulary, the thermal noise density level N0 of both transmission models is set
as −174 dbm/Hz. To depict the incentive intensity and the path loss compensation
factor, we set λ as 10 and a as 2, respectively.
As discussed earlier in the paper, we adopt TDD mode to reallocate the uplink
resources to all devices from the same coalition, where the devices share the same
radio resources of coalition. However, the above allocation mode can lead to mutual
interference among the devices in the same coalition. To avoid mutual interference
among these devices, we consider resource allocation of the best case and the worst
case, and analyze both cases in this work which correspond to the upper and lower
bounds and the other cases of resource sharing fall between them.
The performance evaluation focuses on the average data uploading latency. To
evaluate the efficiency of our proposed generalized data uploading scheme denoted
by GDUS, we compare the performance among our proposed GDUS, the constrained
coalition formation scheme (CCFS) proposed in [25] and the non-cooperative upload-
ing scheme(NCUS), where the data is directly uploaded by the devices to the BS.
4.3.2 Performance Gain by D2D Cooperation
We focus on a sample scenario of the stable coalitional structure formed by D2D
cooperation in which two cases (i.e., best case and worst case) are considered. The
objective is to analyze coalition formation process, and then compare the data up-
loading latency under the NCUS, best case (GDUS-BC) and worst case (GDUS-WC)
in our proposed GDUS.
Figure 4-1 shows the sample of the formed coalitions with N = 50,M = 20
and d = 100 m under the best case and the worst case, in which the base station,
the devices with uploading data (DUDs) and the devices without uploading data
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(DNUDs) are labelled as solid star, solid circle and hollow circle, respectively. Each
formed coalition based on D2D cooperation is connected by arrow line. In addition,
the devices with uploading data are marked as the numbers from 1 to 20.






































































Figure 4-1: Sample of a stable coalitional structure resulting from our scheme for (a)
best case and (b) worst case with N = 50,M = 20 and d = 100 m.
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Figure 4-2: Data uploading latency under NCUS, best case (GDUS-BC) and worst
case (GDUS-WC) in Figure 4-1.
As depicted in Figure 4-1(a), we can see that all DUDs and most of DNUDs
participate in D2D cooperation under the best case. This is because that the best
case considers no interference among simultaneously transmitting devices in the same
coalition, and then each device in the coalition can share the radio resource with the
other devices in the coalition, which increases the cooperative opportunities among
the devices and leads to more devices (i.e., partial DNUDs and all DUDs) taking part
in D2D cooperation.
In the worst case, due to the interference among simultaneously transmitting
devices in the same coalition, each device only utilize the allocated radio resources in
advance, which reduces the cooperative possibilities among the devices. Therefore,
we can find from Figure 4-1(b) that some DUDs do not participate in any coalition
and the data from those devices is directly uploaded to the BS (e.g., device 1, 2, 6).
For each device with uploading data in Figure 4-1, the data uploading latency under
the best case (GDUS-BC) and the worst case (GDUS-WC) is obtained based on our
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proposed scheme and the NCUS in Figure 4-2. We can note that the data uploading
latency is minimum under the GDUS-BC.




































































Figure 4-3: Average data uploading latency versus the number of devices with
uploading data using NCUS, GDUS and CCFS for (a) best case and (b) worst case
with N = 50, d = 100 m.
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Figure 4-4: Average data uploading latency versus the number of all devices in de-
ployed cell using NCUS, GDUS and CCFS for (a) best case and (b) worst case with
M = 20, d = 100 m.
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4.3.3 Performance Gain of Our Scheme
In this subsection, we give the comparisons on the average data uploading latency
obtained by GDUS, NCUS and CCFS for best case and worst case. In Figure 4-3, we
show the average data uploading latency with N = 50 and d = 100 m for different
number of DUDs (M). From Figure 4-3, we can see that the average data uploading
latency increases with the increase of number of DUDs, and that our proposed GDUS
outperforms the other two schemes (i.e., NCUS and CCFS). Moreover, we can also
observe that when the number of DUDs reaches to the maximum value 50, the result
achieved by the GDUS is similar to that achieved by CCFS. This is because that in
this case, all devices in our deployed cell need to upload data, which is a scenario
considered by CCFS, and thus our proposed GDUS can cover the CCFS as a special
case.
Figure 4-4 shows the average data uploading latency with M = 20 and d = 100
m for different number of all devices (N) in the deployed cell. We can find that the
average data uploading latency from our proposed GDUS decreases with the increase
of number of devices, whereas that for NCUS and CCFS changes in a small scale.
This is because, as the number of all devices (N) increases, the DUDs can cooperate
with more DNUDs to upload data in GDUS and thus the average data uploading
latency is reduced. Since NCUS and CCFS only focus on cooperative data uploading
among the DUDs without consideration of D2D cooperation from the DNUDs, the
time is not related to the value of N when M is fixed.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, a generalized data uploading scheme was proposed by leveraging
D2D cooperation among all available devices to reduce the average data uploading
latency. In this scheme, the devices within communication range were rewarded
to establish D2D cooperation and then form the multi-hop D2D chains for data
uploading. Specifically, a coalitional game was introduced to formulate the problem
of cooperative D2D data uploading, and then we devised a merge-and-split formation
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algorithm to obtain the solution for the formulated coalitional game. Simulation
results showed that our proposed scheme outperforms the state-of-the-art schemes.
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Algorithm 1 Coalition formation algorithm for cooperative D2D data uploading:
Input:
The set of devices N ,M and cooperative database N pu , u ∈ N .
Output:
A stable coalitional structure Sfin = {S1, S2, ..., Sk}
(each Si denotes a coalition for 1 ≤ i ≤ k).
1: Initialize coalition index i = 1 and cycle count f = 0;
2: Initialize the set of selected devices V = ϕ;
3: Initialize the reward set C = {c1, c2, ..., cN} = ϕ;
4: Allocate B = {B1, ..., BM} according to MT scheduling policy;
5: Sort devices ∀u ∈M with an ascending order of their uplink CQI;
6: for u ∈M and u /∈ V do
7: Set V = V ∪ {u} and Si = {u} ;
8: while N pu ̸= ϕ and f ̸= |N pu | do
9: Sort devices ∀v ∈ N pu in a descending order of their D2D CQI;
10: for v ∈ N pu do
11: if v /∈ V then
12: Execute Procedure Merge operation ;
13: if {Si ∪ {v}} ◃ {{v}, Si} then
14: Set Si = Si ∪ {v} and V = V ∪ {v};
15: Update the reward of devices v;
16: Set v as the current device of Si and go to step 8;
17: end if
18: end if
19: if v ∈ V then
20: Traverse all formed coalitions to search for Si′ , v ∈ Si′ ;
21: Take v as the threshold point to divide coalition Si′ into two coalitions
Si′1 and Si′2 with v ∈ Si′2, v /∈ Si′1;
22: Execute Procedure Split operation ;
23: if {Si′1, Si′2 ∪ Si} ◃ {Si′ , Si} then
24: Set Si′ = {Si′1, Si′2},Si = Si ∪ Si′2, Si′ = Si′1;
25: Update the rewards of the devices in coalition Si;
26: Set Si′1 as the current coalition and go to step 8;
27: end if
28: end if
29: Set cycle count f = f + 1;
30: end for
31: end while
32: i = i+ 1 and search for the next coalition Si;
33: end for
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Procedure 1 Merge operation:
1: Set the sum of radio resources Bsum = 0;
2: if Best Case then
3: Calculate the total resources Bsum =
∑
j∈Si∪{v}Bj in set Si ∪ {v};
4: Set the resource of each device Bj = Bsum,∀j ∈ Si ∪ {v};
5: Calculate the reward cv(Si ∪ {v}) based on (4.1);
6: Compare the reward cv(Si ∪ {v}) and cv;
7: end if
8: if Worst Case then
9: Calculate the reward cv(Si ∪ {v}) based on (4.1);
10: Compare the reward cv(Si ∪ {v}) and cv;
11: end if
Procedure 2 Split operation:
1: Set the sum of radio resources Bsum = 0;
2: if Best Case then
3: Calculate the total resources Bsum =
∑
j∈Si′2∪Si
Bj in set Si′2 ∪ Si;
4: Set the resource of each device Bj = Bsum,∀j ∈ Si′2 ∪ Si;
5: Calculate the reward cj(Si′2 ∪ Si),∀j ∈ Si′2 ∪ Si based on (4.1);
6: Compare the reward cj(Si′2 ∪ Si) and cj for ∀j ∈ Si′2 ∪ Si;
7: end if
8: if Worst Case then
9: Calculate the reward cj(Si′2 ∪ Si),∀j ∈ Si′2 ∪ Si based on (4.1);
10: Compare the reward cj(Si′2 ∪ Si) and cj for ∀j ∈ Si′2 ∪ Si;
11: end if
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The social-aware data uploading study of D2D enabled cellular networks is critical for
supporting their applications. This chapter extends the previous works on cooperative
D2D data uploading with full trust and no trust to the more real social network
scenario, and investigates the problem of cooperative D2D data uploading with the
consideration of the impact of human social relationships on cooperation behaviors.
Specifically, we introduce the human social relationship to provide the trustworthy
assistance for D2D cooperation, where the nearby devices with mutual trust can
build D2D cooperative relationships. To model D2D cooperation, a coalition game
is then developed, and we devise a coalition formation algorithm to implement the
formulated coalitional game, where the devices with the poor uplink channel quality
are first considered to join D2D cooperation and the bottom to top mode is adopted
to construct the D2D chains. Simulation results show that our proposed approach
can effectively reduce the average data uploading latency compared with the state-
of-the-art approaches under the real network scenario.
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5.1 Human Social Relationship
To guarantee the data uploading reliability, human social relationship is provided
as the trustworthy assistance for D2D cooperation among devices. To describe the
cooperative relationships among devices, we introduce the social trust graph Gs =
{V s, εs} [39]. Here V s is the set of vertices to denote the set of devices, and εs =
{(uv) : esuv = 1, ∀u, v ∈ N} is the set of edge, where esuv = 1 if and only if device
u and device v have the trustworthy relationship (i.e., family member, friend and
colleague). Based on Gs, each vertex (i.e., device) u can build its social trust database
N su = {v : esuv = 1,∀v ∈ N}.
Based on the physical cooperative graph and the social trust graph mentioned
above, we introduce the physical-social graph G = {V, ε}. Here V is the set of
vertices to denote the set of devices, and ε = {(uv) : euv = esuv · epuv = 1,∀u, v ∈ N} is
the set of edge, where euv = 1 if and only if device u and device v have the trust-based
relationship and are within communicate range. Based on G, each device u can build
its cooperative database Nu = {v : euv = 1,∀v ∈ N}. Clearly, all devices in Nu can
help device u. For simplicity, we generalize the cooperative database of device u as
Nu ∪ s, where s represents the BS. If device u chooses s as the cooperator, it means
that device u uploads data directly to the BS.
5.2 Coalitional Game Formulation
In this work, our objective is to construct multi-hop chains for data uploading by D2D
cooperation so that the data uploading latency is reduced. Thus, a key challenge is
how to efficiently divide the devices into multiple chains. Taking the basic concepts
into consideration from [54], we formally define a coalitional game Ω = {N ,XN ,V}
to solve the chain formation problem, where
• The set of players N is the set of all devices.
• XN = {(vu)u∈N : vu ∈ Nu∪s, ∀u ∈ N} is the set of cooperative strategies for all
players. Here, it represents the set of possible cooperators for all devices based
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on their cooperative database.
• V(S) = {(vu)u∈N ∈ XN : {vu}u∈S = {w}w∈S and {v′u}u′∈N\S = {w′}w′∈N\S
}
is
the characteristic function which is defined on the coalition S ⊆ N . Here
the condition {vu}u∈S = {w}w∈S represents the feasible cooperation among all
devices in coalition S, the condition {v′u}u′∈N\S = {w′}w′∈N\S represents other
devices out of coalition S do not take part in any cooperation in S.
The critical mechanism in coalition game formation is to enable the player to
join or leave a coalition based on the well-defined preference. Here, we introduce the
concept of preference order ◃u [65] for player u as follows.
Definition 1 : For each player u ∈ N , the preference order ◃u is defined as a
complete, reflexive, and transitive binary relation on the set of all coalitions that
player u can possibly form.
In our formulated coalition game, each device can select its potential cooperators
according to its preference order. For device u, v◃uv
′ means that u prefers to cooperate
with v than v′, where v, v′ ∈ Xu∪ s. Considered low-latency data uploading problem,
we construct the preference order in terms of the data uploading latency. As a result,
each device u ∈ N can select a preference cooperator v = argminv∈Nu∪sTu(S) with
|S| ≥ 1 as the preference order to cooperate in uploading data.
5.3 Coalition Formation Algorithm
In this section, we first introduce the definition of core, which is used to assess the
stability of coalition structure, and then devise a coalition formation algorithm to con-
struct multi-hop chains for data uploading. Finally, we analyze the time complexity
of our proposed algorithm.
5.3.1 The Definition of Core
The solution of coalition game formation is to search the set of feasible coalitions which
guarantee that devices do not have incentives to leave a given coalition and then join
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another coalition according to the preference order. This condition is described as
coalition structure stability. The core [56] is used to assess the stability of coalition
structure, which is defined as follows.
Definition 2 : The core is the set of cooperative strategy (x(N ) ∈ V(N ) for which
there is no coalition S and S-feasible cooperative strategy (y(S) ∈ V(S)) so that
yu(S) > xu(N ).
In other words, the core guarantees that no coalition can leave the formed coalition
structure and provide a better allocation for all members by deviating the formed
coalition structure.
5.3.2 Coalition Formation Algorithm
To obtain the solution of core, we construct trust-ware assisted coalition formation
algorithm, as summarized in Algorithm 1. By starting from noncooperative device
set N and cooperative strategy XN , the execution process is divided into two phases:
the prepared stage and the formation stage. In prepared stage, we initialize the flag
set F = {0} of all devices and coalition number k = 1, and then sort all devices in a
ascending order of CQI.
In formation stage, we search all feasible coalitions to form a stable coalition
structure Sfin from lines 4-21. For each formation coalition Sk, we first select a
device u from N which does not join any coalitions and needs to upload data to the
BS, and then join device u into coalition Sk in lines 5-8. Form lines 9 to 19, we
iteratively select a cooperator v for the current device u from Xu with the preference
order to construct the coalition Sk.
Once device u is joined into coalition Sk, we sort the cooperative strategy Xu of
device u with the preference order, and then successively select a cooperator v for the
current device u from Xu to join coalition Sk until no preferable device v ∈ Xu can
help device u. The coalition Sk forms and the iterative procedure repeats until M
devices with data uploading have involved in the formed coalitions. Finally, a stable
coalition structure Sfin forms.
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Algorithm 1 Trust-ware assisted coalition formation algorithm:
Require:
N = {1, 2, ..., N};XN = {(vu)u∈N : vu ∈ Nu ∪ s}.
Ensure:
A stable coalition structure Sfin = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ ... ∪ Sk.
1: Set the flag F = {Fu : Fu = 0, u ∈ N};
2: Initialize coalition number k = 1;
3: Sort N in a ascending order of CQI;
4: while u ∈ N do
5: if Fu = 1 and v = u then
6: continue;
7: end if
8: Sk ← u, Fu = 1;
9: repeat
10: Sort Xu with the preference order;
11: while v ∈ Xu and v ̸= u do
12: if Fv = 1 then
13: continue;
14: else
15: Sk ← v, Fv = 1;
16: Set v as the current device, break;
17: end if
18: end while
19: until v ̸= u
20: k = k + 1 and search the next coalition Sk;
21: end while
22: return Sfin = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ ... ∪ Sk.
5.3.3 Algorithm Analysis
Here, we analyze the time complexity of Algorithm 1. In this algorithm, for searching
all feasible coalitions, the iteration from lines 4 to 21 is executed at most N times, i.e.,
we consider the scenario of worst case that N devices forms N singleton coalitions.
For selecting all devices of each coalition, the iteration from lines 9 to 19 is executed at
most N times, i.e., we need to traverse all devices in N . For searching the cooperators
for each device of each coalition, the iteration from lines 11 to 18 is executed at mostN
times, i.e., the worst case is that each device has N cooperators. Thus, the algorithm
has a computational complexity of O(N3). Notice that our proposed algorithm can
converge to a stable coalition partition (i.e., the stability). The proof of the stability
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of our proposed algorithm is similar to the proof of the stability in [37].
5.4 Numerical Results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of social-aware cooperative D2D data
uploading. We first set some simulation parameters, and then evaluate and compare
the average data uploading latency of our proposed approach and other approaches.
5.4.1 Simulation Settings
In the performance evaluations, we consider a radius of 500 m round area with the
BS in the center, where N = 50 devices are randomly scattered within the coverage
of the BS, and M devices need to upload data to the BS. To derive the data amount
of M devices, we adopt the real datasets from [64] that matches the practical network
scenarios. We assume that the locations of all devices are fixed during a D2D com-
munication scheduling period, and the maximum communication distance between
arbitrary two devices is denoted by d. In addition, a 10MHz spectrum band that
operates at 2.5GHz carrier frequency is considered. The thermal noise density of
both channels is −174dbm/Hz. Over the cellular channel, the transmit power of each
device is 23dbm, and the D2D channel transmit power is −19dbm.
We evaluate and compare the average data uploading latency of constrained coali-
tion formation algorithm (CCFA) proposed in [25] and our proposed trust-aware as-
sisted coalition formation algorithm (TCFA). We consider three different trust degrees
to evaluate the average uploading latency, namely, no trust, partial trust and com-
plete trust. In the first case, there is no social trust between any two devices. In the
third case, there is complete trust between any two devices. In the second case, only
partial devices are provided with the trust relationship. To describe partial trust, we
assume that social edge esuv exists between any user u and v with probability Ps, and


































Complete trust  Partial trust No trust
Figure 5-1: Comparison on the average data uploading latency between TCFA and
CCFA for different trust degrees with d = 100 m, N = 50 and M = 30.
5.4.2 Performance Analysis
In Figure 5-1, we compare the average data uploading latency using TCFA and CCFA
with N = 50,M = 30, d = 100m for different trust degrees. We observe that TCFA
outperforms CCFA. Such behavior can be attributed to the reason that the devices
without uploading data have occupied some radio resources in CCFA, but do not
join any coalition. For our proposed TCFA, we only allocate radio resources to the
devices with uploading data, and the devices without uploading data attend coalition
formation if they can reduce the data uploading latency of other devices.
We also observe that, for different trust degrees, using complete trust is better
than other two trust degrees for both algorithms (i.e.,TCFA and CCFA)). It is because
that the devices with complete trust have more chances to participate in cooperation
relationship compared to ones with partial trust. Under the case of no trust case,
all devices need to directly upload their data to the BS, so they need more time to
uploading data to the BS.




































Figure 5-2: Comparison on the average data uploading latency between TCFA and


































Figure 5-3: Comparison on the average data uploading latency between TCFA and
CCFA for different number of devices with d = 100 m, N = 50 and complete trust.
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for d = 100m, 300m, 500m with N = 50, M = 30 and complete trust among all
devices. From the results in Figure 5-2, we can observe the similar conclusions as
that in Figure 5-1. It is notable that, in both algorithms, the average data uploading
latency decreases with the increase of communication distance d. This is due to the
facts that more devices participate in cooperation with the increase of communication
distance d. After the communication distance d increases to a certain value, the
number of formed coalitions will not increase, and thus the average data uploading
latency does not decrease even if the communication distance d increases.
To better understand the impact of M , we evaluate the average data uploading
latency using TCFA and CCFA for M = 20, M = 30, and M = 40 with d = 100m,
N = 50 and complete trust among all devices. As depicted in Figure 5-3, we can
observe that the average data uploading latency in our proposed TCFA is greatly
reduced compared to CCFA. We also observe that the average data uploading latency
increases with the increase of device numbers M . This is because that more devices
have more data amount.
5.5 Summary
This chapter investigated the impact of human social relationships on cooperative
behaviors. A coalition game was then adopted to formulate the problem of D2D
cooperation for data uploading. Based on formulated coalition game, we devised a
coalition formation algorithm to construct D2D chains by adopting the bottom to
top mode. Simulation results showed our proposed approach outperforms the state-
of-the-art approaches under the real network scenario.
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Data Uploading with Incentive
Mechanism
Under the social network scenario, this chapter proposes an incentive mechanism to
motivate more devices to participate in D2D cooperation, such that data uploading
latency can be reduced and data uploading reliability can be enhanced. With this
incentive mechanism, the nearby devices can obtain rewards such that they are will-
ing to construct a multi-hop D2D chain to assist the other devices in data uploading.
To this end, we adopt coalitional game to formulate the D2D chain with careful con-
sideration of social-aware data uploading, where each device acts as a player and the
individual reward is modeled as the utility function. We further design a coalition for-
mation algorithm with merge-and-split rules to determine the solution for formulated
D2D chain. Extensive simulations are conducted to illustrate that the performance
gain of our incentive mechanism outperforms that of non-incentive mechanism.
6.1 Design of Incentive Mechanism
Mobile devices exert their effort levels (e.g., the amount of energy and time spent)
to perform data uploading tasks, and then the crowdsourcer can offer the virtual
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rewards (e.g., credit, penalties, etc.) to the devices for their contribution in return,
which is called incentive mechanism. In our incentive mechanism, the reward received
by device is determined by two factors: the data uploading latency and the data
uploading reliability. The former represents the time duration from the beginning to
the end of data delivery, while the latter which is used for assessing safety of data
received by the BS is measured by trustworthy relationship. In the following part
of this section, we take chain S with 1 ≤ l ≤ N devices as an example to calculate
the reward of each device. First, we obtain the data uploading latency calculated by
Chapter 3, and then we define and calculate the data uploading reliability. Finally,
we provide a reward to devices which participate in cooperative D2D data uploading.
Considering the calculation method of the data uploading latency in Chapter 3,
we obtain the data uploading latency from device u ∈ S, which is given by













Since multiple devices are recruited to perform the same data uploading task
in D2D cooperation, we define the data uploading reliability as a joint trustworthy
relationship among multiple devices. This definition is realistic and general, and has
been adopted in [66]. Here, the data uploading reliability of device u ∈ S, denoted





Corresponding the data uploading latency tu(S) and data uploading reliability
su(S) of device u ∈ S, the reward cu(S) offered by the crowdsourcer, which is inversely
proportional to the data uploading latency tu(S) and directly proportional to the data
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uploading reliability su(S), is defined by





















where α > 0 and β > 0 are regarded as the scaling factors, which are used for
describing incentive intensity.
When all devices of chain S achieve data uploading, the BS can offer the rewards,




























Then, the next step is how to construct multi-hop D2D chains to effectively dis-
tribute the rewards C(S) to all members of each chain according to their individual
contributions, so that the corresponding reward received by any device can be max-
imized. As a result, we employ a coalitional game to solve this issue and the details
will be discussed in the followings.
6.2 Coalitional Game Formulation
In this section, we first introduce a nontransferable utility (NTU) coalitional game to
formulate the problem of cooperative D2D chain formation under social-aware data
uploading, and then analyze two essential properties of our concerned coalitional
game: the superadditivity and core.
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6.2.1 NTU Coalitional Game
In our work, the key issue is how to improve the rewards of the entire chain by D2D
cooperation, and then effectively distribute the rewards to all members of the chain
according to their individual contributions. Therefore, we employ a nontransferable
utility (NTU) coalitional game to address this problem. For the sake of completeness,
we first give a brief introduction to the NTU coalitional game [54], which is defined
as follows.
Definition 1 : The NTU coalitional game is represented by the pair (N ,V), where
N is the set of players, and V is a characteristic function for each nonempty coalition
S ⊆ N with V(S) ⊆ R|S|. V(S) describes a set of payoff vectors x(S) of all players
in coalition S, in which each element xu(S) of the vector x(S) is a payoff that player
u ∈ S can obtain through the feasible cooperation with other players in coalition S.
In our concerned coalitional game, N is the set of all devices in deployed area,
which corresponds to game players. The payoff xu(S) of each player u in coalition S
is measured as the reward cu(S) received by device u in chain S. To calculate the
reward cu(S) received by device u ∈ S, we consider chain S with u− 1 devices before
the uth device participates in S, and the total reward of u− 1 devices is labelled as
C ′(S), which is obtained by formula (6.4). After the uth device participates in S, the
total reward of u devices is determined as C(S) by formula (6.4). Then the reward
cu(S) received by device u ∈ S is defined by





















































In addition, each device u needs to consume its energy when it delivers data
(its own and the received one) to the next device, and thus we calculate the energy
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consumption eu(S) of device u according to the calculation method in [25]. As we
know, no feasible device is willing to receive a negative utility. That is to say, the
reward cu(S) received by device u ∈ S should satisfy following condition: cu(S) >
eu(S).
Considering the basic concepts from [54] and the device utility calculated above, we
cast the chain formation problem for social-aware data uploading as a NTU coalitional
game, which is represented by a triple (N ,XN ,V), and then we formally depict the
formulation of this game as follows.
• Player. The set of players N is the set of all devices.
• Cooperative strategy. The set of cooperative strategies XN = {N pu : ∀u ∈ N}
represents the set of possible cooperators for device u ∈ N based on their
cooperative database N pu .
• Characteristic function. The characteristic function V(S) is the value for every
coalition S ⊆ N . It is a nontransferable payoff considering the reward cu(S) for
any device u ∈ S, which depends on the feasible cooperations among all devices
in S, without relationship on other devices out of S.
6.2.2 Property Analysis
Our concerned coalitional game refers to two essential properties: the superadditivity
and core [56]. Then, we introduce the concept of superadditivity in the following.
Definition 2 : A NTU coalitional game (N ,V) is said to be superadditive if for
any two coalitions S1, S2 ⊂ N and S1 ∩ S2 = ϕ, the following condition holds
V(S1 ∪ S2) ⊃ {x(S1 ∪ S2) ∈ R|S1∪S2||
xu(S1) ∈ V(S1), xv(S2) ∈ V(S2)},
(6.6)
where x(S1 ∪ S2) is a payoff vector for coalition S1 ∪ S2. Due to superadditivity,
cooperation is always beneficial, and the players have an incentive to form the grand
coalition where all players are in a coalition. Then we have the following theorem.
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Theorem 1 : Our concerned coalitional game is nonsuperadditive.
Proof: Consider two disjoint coalitions S1 and S2 in cellular network with their
corresponding payoff vectors x(S1) and x(S2) when they do not cooperate with each
other. Here, we consider two cases to prove the nonsuperadditive of our concerned
coalitional game. The first case is when the devices of coalitions S1 and S2 are without
communication range with each other, and then coalitions S1, S2 can not construc-
t coalition S1 ∪ S2 by D2D cooperation. Therefore, the payoff vectors x(S1 ∪ S2)
obtained by coalition S1 ∪ S2 is equal to the payoff vectors x(S1) and x(S2). The
second one is that all devices of coalition S1 ∪ S2 are within mutual communica-
tion range. We assume that the devices of coalitions S1 and S2 share all radio re-
sources of coalitions S1 and S2, respectively. Furthermore, we assume that there
exists interference among mobile devices between coalitions S1 and S2, and thus
tu(S1 ∪ S2) > tu(S1), ∀u ∈ S1 and tv(S1 ∪ S2) > tv(S1),∀v ∈ S2 according to the for-
mula (6.1). In addition, we assume that esuv = 0 for ∀u ∈ S1, v ∈ S2. Under the above
confined conditions, if coalitions S1 and S2 can form coalition S1 ∪ S2, we can obtain
cu(S1 ∪ S2) < cu(S1),∀u ∈ S1 and cv(S1 ∪ S2) < cv(S1), ∀v ∈ S2 according to (6.5).
Therefore, xu(S1 ∪ S2) < xu(S1),∀u ∈ S1 and xv(S1 ∪ S2) < xv(S2), ∀v ∈ S2, which
is inconsistent with the definition of superadditivity. Thus, our concerned coalitional
game is nonsuperadditive. As another key property, the core is defined as follows.
Definition 3 : The core of NTU coalitional game (N ,V) is the set of payoff
vector (x(N ) ∈ V(N ) where there is no coalition S and S-feasible payoff vector
(x′(S) ∈ V(S)) so that x′u((S)) > xu(N ).
In other words, the core guarantees that no coalition S has incentives to leave the
formed grand coalition and provides a better payoff for all members by deviating the
formed grand coalition. Therefore, the formed grand coalition is stable if one can find
a feasible payoff vector that lies in the core.
Theorem 2 : In general, the core of the grand coalition is empty.
Proof: In our concerned coalitional game, the devices in the same coalition may
share same radio resources to maximize the system resource utilization. If there exists
interference among simultaneously delivering devices in the formed grand coalition,
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the devices without uploading data deviate from the grand coalition as those devices
are not allocated resources and do not share resource with other devices due to inter-
ference. Consequently, the payoff vector that lies in the core cannot be found, and the
grand coalition is unstable as the core of our concerned coalitional game is empty. As
a result, due to the nonsuperadditive, the grand coalition cannot form and the grand
coalition is unstable as the core is empty. Instead, independent disjoint coalitions
may form. Thus, we devise a coalition formation algorithm to find independent and
disjoint coalition partitions.
6.3 Coalition Formation Algorithm
In this section, we first introduce coalition formation theory, which is used for ana-
lyzing how to formulate independent disjoint coalitions, and then develop a merge-
and-split formation algorithm to determine the solution for D2D chain formulation.
6.3.1 Coalition Formation Theory
Coalition formation theory [56] has been an important research direction in coalitional
game. It mainly analyzes the formation of coalitional structure when the grand
coalition does not form. To describe coalitional structure, we introduce the concept
of coalitional collection S, which is defined as the set S = {S1, S2, ..., Sk} of mutually
disjoint coalitions in N (i.e., Si ⊂ N and Si ∩ Sj = ϕ for ∀i, j). If
∪k
i=1 Si = N , the
collection S is called a coalitional structure (or a partition) of N .
For finding a feasible coalition structure, we need to search all partitions of the set
N . The number of partitions of set N grows exponentially with the device number in
set N and is given by a value known as the Bell number [57]. However, this approach
for exhaustive search is an NP-complete problem [58], and thus it is not feasible.
To derive the feasible coalitional structure, we introduce simple merge-and-split rules
[59], which enable players of setN to join or leave a coalition based on the well-defined
preferences. In other words, the player decides to join a coalition if it can increase
own utility by this coalition. Likewise, the player considers leaving a coalition if it
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reduces individual utility from this coalition. To describe merge-and-split rules, we
first introduce the concept of preference relation [59] for collection comparison.
Definition 4 : A preference relation ◃ is defined for comparing two collections
S = {S1, S2, ..., Sk} and S ′ = {S ′1, S ′2, ..., S ′l} that are partitions of the same subset
A ⊆ N . If S ◃ S ′, it implies that the partitions S of A is preferable to the partitions
S ′ of A.
Various well known orders can be used as preference relations [59]. These order-
s are split into two categories: coalition value orders and individual value orders.
Coalition value orders compare two collections (or partitions) using coalition value.
Individual value orders perform the comparison using the individual payoffs. In our
work, we define the preference relation using individual value orders, due to the fact
that our objective in coalitional formation is to increase the utility of each device. Let
collections S and S ′ be the partition of N , where the sets of individual payoffs x(S)
and x′(S ′) are resulted from the collections S and S ′, respectively. The preference
relation for our concerned coalitional game is defined as follows
S ◃ S ′ ⇔ {xu(S) ≥ y′u(S ′), ∀u ∈ N and xu(S) > x′u(S ′), ∃u ∈ N} (6.7)
This definition implies that collection S is preferred over collection S ′, if at least
one player can improve its individual payoff without hurting other players’ profits
when coalitional structure changes from S ′ to S. Based on our defined preference
relation, we then introduce the merge-and-split rules [59], which are described as
follows
• Merge Rule: Merge any set of coalitions {S1, S2, ..., Sk} into a single new coali-
tion S ′ =
∪k
i=1 Si, if S
′ ◃ {S1, S2, ..., Sk}.
• Split Rule: Split any coalition S ′ into multiple new coalitions {S1, S2, ..., Sk}, if
{S1, S2, ..., Sk} ◃ S ′, where S ′ =
∪k
i=1 Si.
The merge rule means that at least one player can improve its individual payoff
while other players’ payoffs do not be decreased through merge operation. Similarly,
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the split rule means that at least one player can obtain an increase for individual
payoff through split operation, whereas no other players suffers decreasing on the
payoffs.
6.3.2 Merge-and-Split Algorithm
Algorithm 1 Merge-and-split formation algorithm:
1. Initialize the set of the devices N = {1, 2, 3, ..., N} andM = {1, 2, 3, ...,M};
2. Set the initial coalition structure Sini = N and the current coalition structure as
Sini → Scur.
3. repeat
4. Randomly select any two coalitions S and S ′ with communication range after
merging;
5. Calculate the utility of any device under coalition S∪S ′ and {S, S ′} according
to (6.5);
6. if S ∪ S ′ ◃ {S, S ′} then
7. Merge S and S ′ into S ∪ S ′;
8. Update the current partition Scur;
9. end if
10. Randomly select one feasible coalition S = S1 ∪ S2 after splitting;
11. Calculate the utility of any device under coalition S and {S1, S2} according
to (6.5);
12. if {S1, S2} ◃ S then
13. Split S into S1 and S2;
14. Update the current partition Scur;
15. end if
16. until A stable coalition structure Sfin forms.
Based on merge-and-split rules, we devise a coalition formation algorithm to obtain
the solution for the formulated coalitional game, as summarized in Algorithm 1. In
this Algorithm, we first initialize the system byN ,M , Sini, Scur in lines 1-2, where we
assume that all devices in set N are noncooperative, and then we iteratively construct
a stable coalition structure Sfin from lines 3-16. In each iteration, we randomly select
any two coalitions S and S ′ with mutual communication range, and then calculate
the utility of any device under coalition S ∪ S ′ and {S, S ′} according to (6.5). If
S ∪ S ′ ◃ {S, S ′}, we merge coalitions {S, S ′} into a single new coalition S ∪ S ′, and
update the current coalition structure Scur. Otherwise, it remains unchanged. The
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merging procedure repeats until no couple of coalitions can be merged. Similarly,
we randomly select one feasible coalition S = S1 ∪ S2, and then calculate the utility
of any device under coalition S and {S1, S2} according to (6.5). If {S1, S2} ◃ S, we
split coalitions S into two coalitions S1 and S2, and update the current coalition
structure Scur. Otherwise, it remains unchanged. The splitting procedure repeats
until no coalition can be split. If all coalitions from the current coalition structure
have been checked through merging or splitting and no one coalition structure is most
preferable, the procedure is terminated and a stable coalitional structure Sfin forms.
6.4 Algorithm Analysis
In this subsection, we investigate three important properties of the proposed coalition
formation algorithm in terms of convergence, stability and computation complexity.
As coalition formation algorithm constructed by merge-and-split rules can converge,
which is proved by [59], and thus we give corresponding analysis for stability and
computation complexity as follows.
6.4.1 Stability Analysis
In our work, we prove theoretically that our proposed coalition formation algorithm
converges to a stable coalition structure with disjoint coalitions by adopting the defec-
tion function Dhp [59], [61], which is mainly used for assessing the partition stability
resulting from the merge-and-split rule, and is defined in [41].
Definition 5 : A coalition structure S is Dhp-stable if no players in S benefits from
leaving current S and forming other coalition structures of N by executing a merge
or a split operation.
Obviously, a coalition structure S = {S1, S2, ..., Sk} is Dhp-stable if and only if the
following two conditions are satisfied [61].
• For any i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k} and the partition {A1, A2, ...Al} of any coalition Si,
{A1, A2, ...Al} 7 Si, where 7 is the opposite rule of the preference order ◃.
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i∈T Si 7 {Si|i ∈ W}.
With the definition of Dhp-stable, we prove our formed coalition structure S =
{S1, S2, ..., Sk} is Dhp-stable according to Theorem 3.
Theorem 3: Every the outcome of iteration from our proposed merge-and-split
formation algorithm is Dhp-stable.
Proof: After every iteration of merge-and-split algorithm, every device cannot leave
the current coalition structure through merge or split operation without increasing
its utility. Therefore, the formed coalition structure S cannot further merge or split.
We assume that S = {S1, S2, ..., Sk} is the coalition structure resulting from our
proposed merge-and-split formation algorithm. If for the partition {A1, A2, ...Al} of
any coalition Si ∈ S, we have {A1, A2, ...Al} ◃ Si, so the coalition Si can perform
a split operation, which contradicts with our formed coalition structure S resulting
from merge-and-split iterations. Therefore, the first Dhp stability condition is verified.
In addition, the similar method can prove the second Dhp stability condition. When
the above conditions hold, we prove that our formed coalition structure Sfin obtained
from Algorithm 1 is Dhp-stable.
6.4.2 Complexity Analysis
We consider the computational complexity of our proposed coalition formation algo-
rithm. The complexity of this algorithm is determined by the number of iteration of
merge-and-split operations. In the deployment scenario, the system consists ofN non-
cooperative devices. In order to guarantee maximizing cooperation with each other,
each device needs to make a merge operation with other devices in N . In the worst
case, the first device needs N ·(N−1)
2
merge operations, the second needs (N−1)·(N−2)
2
op-
erations and so on. The total number of merge operations will be O(N3). In practice,
the merge process requires the rather less number of operations. The three reasons are
illustrated as follows: once two devices merge, it does not require to go through other
merge operations, and thus the number of merge operations will decrease. Moreover,
each device only attempts to merge the devices with communication range. Finally,
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after the first merge-and-split iteration, most of devices merge to form larger coali-
tions, the number of the rest devices which makes the subsequent iteration is much
smaller than N .
In addition, we analyze the complexity of the split operation. Generally speaking,
the split operation involves finding all possible partitions of each coalition in formed
coalition structure. In the worst case, splitting a coalition S requires to make O(2|S|)
attempts. In practice, this split operation is restricted to the formed coalition struc-
ture. Combined the individual utility with communication range of the device, the
size of the coalitions is quite small. Thus the complexity of the split operation is
reduced. Moreover, once a coalition finds a split operation according to preference
relationship, this coalition will split and the further split operation is not required.
Therefore, this complexity is further reduced. In other words, the complexity of split
operation can be neglected. Finally, our proposed coalition formation algorithm has
a computational complexity of O(N3).
6.5 Numerical Results
In this section, we provide simulation results to evaluate the performance of our pro-
posed incentive mechanism. The evaluating settings, the impact of different parame-
ters and the performance comparison with non-incentive mechanism are presented as
follows.
6.5.1 Evaluating Settings
We carry out the simulations in a 1000 m × 1000 m square area within the base
station in the center, in which N mobile devices within the number range of 0 ∼ 50
are randomly distributed within the coverage of the BS. In our simulation, we assume
thatM ≤ N devices need to upload data to the BS and data amount bu for each device
u is uniformly generated according to the real datasets from [64], which is assessed
by the MPEG-2 encoding standard [67]. Since we use such a random approach to
distribute all devices, we assume that the locations of all devices remain unchanged
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Figure 6-1: Sample of a stable coalitional structure resulting from our scheme with
N = 50, M = 20.
under each simulation scenario and communication distance between any two devices
is set 100 m. To obtain the average of simulation results, we execute the simulations
by 500 times, and each time with random-generated locations.
As an illustration for sample scenario in the simulation, we randomly generate the
positions of the BS, the devices with uploading data (DUDs) and the devices without
uploading data (DNUDs) in Figure 6-1. In this figure, the BS, the DUDs and DNUDs
are represented as solid star, solid circle and hollow circle, respectively. Additionally,
we also show the snapshot of the final coalition structure formed by our proposed
algorithm under the above simulation scenario, where all devices form 5 coalitions by
D2D cooperation, and each formed coalition is connected by arrow line.
To describe social relationships among different users holding these mobile devices,
we construct social relationship graph Gs by adopting the Erdós-Rényi (ER) graph
model [68], where social edge exists between each pair of users with probability Ps. If
social edge between any user u and v exists, social trust esuv between them follows a
normal distribution N(µ, σ) with mean µ and variance σ [69]. We set the parameter
values of social networks as follows: Ps = 0.8, µ = 4, and σ = 2.
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In our simulation, we assume that the uplink channel for cellular transmission
mode and D2D transmission mode is modeled as the Rayleigh fading channel [32],
which takes the large-scale shadowing and the small-scale fading into consideration.
Additionally, we assume that the path losses of uplink channels with both transmis-
sion modes are calculated based on the free space propagation loss model [50], where
the channel coefficient huv on link u → v follows the independent complex Gaussian
distribution CN (0, 1), and the path loss compensation factor is 2. We consider a 10
MHz spectrum band used by cellular transmission and D2D transmission mode that
operates at 2.5 GHz carrier frequency. Over the cellular transmission, the transmis-
sion power of any device is 23 dbm, whereas the transmission power is −19 dbm for
D2D transmission. Both transmissions are with the thermal noise density level −174
dbm/Hz. To depict the different incentive intensity, we assume that the scale factor
α varies within a range of 0 ∼ 1000, and the scale factor β varies from 0 to 1000.
As discussed by previous section, we adopt TDD mode to reassign radio resources
to all devices of the same chain, where the devices in the same chain share either
the same or different resources according to the interference level experienced on
simultaneously delivering devices. In our work, we consider two extreme resource
sharing modes: one is the best case and the other is the worst case. The former
means no interference among simultaneously delivering devices in the same chain,
where all radio resources of the chain can be shared on the D2D uplink. The latter
corresponds to interference among all simultaneously delivering devices in the same
chain, and thus the allocated resources of each device in advance are used on the D2D
uplink. We analyze the above two cases which represent the lower and upper bounds
and all other cases of radio resource sharing in the chains fall on them.
To show the efficiency of our incentive mechanism with social-aware data upload-
ing denoted by SDUM, we compare the performance of our proposed SDUM with
generalized data uploading scheme (GDUS) proposed by [70]. As discussed by Chap-
ter 4, our work is different from the previous one, which focuses on cooperative D2D
data uploading without consideration of incentive mechanism. However, our curren-
t work achieves cooperative D2D data uploading with consideration of the impact
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of incentive mechanism. In our simulations, we take the following three evaluation
metrics into consideration:
• Number of cooperative devices, which is the number of participators that assist
in delivering data.
• System sum utility, which is the aggregated utility obtained by all participating
devices according to (6.5), i.e.,
∑N
u=1 cu
• Successful ratio, which is the ratio between the number of data packet up-
loaded successfully by cooperative devices and the total number of data packet
generated by all devices. Here, a successfully data uploading means that the
data uploading latency is no larger than the tolerable latency t0, and the data
uploading reliability is no less than the tolerable reliability s0.
6.5.2 Impact of Different Parameters
To better understand the performance of our proposed SDUM, we next conduct a
series of sensitivity experiments by adjusting various system parameters. Firstly, we
analyze how to select scale factors α and β to maximize the number of cooperative
devices, and then evaluate the impact of scale factors α and β on system sum utility.
Figure 6-2 shows number of cooperative devices as a function of the value of
incentive percentage, defined as the scale factor α divided by the scale factor β,
under M = 20, 30, 40. To better understand the impact of scale factor α and β,
both best case and worst case are considered and compared. From the curves in
Figure 6-2(a), we see that there exists a best value of α/β which makes number of
cooperative devices reach the peak value. As mentioned in Section 6.1, the value of
scale factor α and β reflect incentive intensity and are used for motivating devices to
participate in D2D cooperation. When α is too small or β is too big, the incentive
mechanism does not work effectively since the devices are not willing to participate
in D2D cooperation with such a low payoff. When α is too big or β is too small, the
number of cooperative devices is seriously affected by the data uploading latency so
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Figure 6-2: Number of cooperative devices versus incentive percentage under M =
20, 30, 40 for (a) best case and (b) worst case.
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that it neglects the incentive impact of data uploading reliability. Therefore, there
exists one optimal value of incentive percentage, i.e., α/β = 4, with which the most
devices can be motivated to participate in D2D collaboration. From Figure 6-2(b),
we can see that the best value of incentive percentage for the worst case is 5.
Additionally, from both Figure 6-2 (a) and (b), we also observe that one bigger M
can lead to that more devices take part in constructing D2D cooperation chain. Such
behavior can be attributed to the reason that bigger M means the data uploading
tasks are more in the network. Therefore, in order to gain more payoffs from the
publicized tasks, more devices are inclined to participate in uploading the tasks by
cooperating with others.
We plot Figure 6-3 to show the effect of the different number of devices with
uploading data (i.e., M = 20, 30, 40) on the system sum utility under both the best
and worst cases. Form Figure 6-3, we can observe that adopting more devices can
improve the system sum utility. Furthermore, we can also note that as the scale
factor α and β increases, system sum utility can be further improved for any device
number M , which can be proved by formula 6.5. While α and β increasing for either
the best case or worst case, the reward that each device received by participating in
data uploading will increase, and improve the system sum utility.
6.5.3 Comparison with Other Uploading Scheme
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed SDUM, we evaluate the performance
of the GDUS and the SDUM on successful ratio in terms of the tolerable latency t0,
the tolerable reliability s0 and the number of the devices with uploading data M .
In the performance comparison, we implement the experiments with M = 50, the
default threshold t0 = 3000 and s0 = 3. The default optimal value under best case
and worst case are given as α = 1000, β = 250 and α = 1000, β = 200, respectively.
Figure 6-4 presents the successful ratio with the variations of tolerable latency t0
and tolerable reliability s0 under best case and worst case. From Figure 6-4, we can
see that as the tolerable latency t0 increases and the tolerable reliability s0 deceases,
the successful ratio increases. This result is consistent with our expectation. Besides,
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Figure 6-3: System sum utility versus number of devices with uploading data under













































































Figure 6-4: Successful ratio from our scheme versus the tolerable latency t0 and the
tolerable reliability s0 for (a) best case and (b) worst case.
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we also see that the successful ratio of worst case is smaller than that of best case
under the same parameter setting. This is because in worst case, in order to avoid
the interference among simultaneously delivering devices in the same coalitions, each
device of coalitions utilizes allocated orthogonal resources in advance, which reduces
data uploading latency of each device of coalitions. While the best case considers no
interference among simultaneously delivering devices in the same coalitions, and then
mobile device in the same coalitions can share the radio resource with each other,
which increases data uploading latency of each device of coalitions. However, there
is no decrease on data uploading reliability for each device, and thus, successful ratio
of best case is better than that of best case.
Considering the result in Figure 6-4, we select the three groups of typical threshold
s0, t0 and then compare and evaluate successful ratio of SDUM and GDUS using three
groups of typical threshold s0, t0. Figure 6-5 shows successful ratio versus the tolerable
reliability s0 and tolerable latency t0 using SDUM and GDUS for best case and worst
case. From Figure 6-5, we note that the trends of the GDUS are similar with those
of SDUM. but the gaps between both approaches become widen as the tolerable
reliability s0 increases. This is because the incentive cost of data uploading reliability
is not considered by GDUS, while our SDUM considers the incentive impact of data
uploading reliability on motivating D2D cooperation among devices, and thus, we can
find from Figure 6-5 that the influence of s0 on successful ratio for GDUS is higher
than our SDUM. Similar analysis stands for the curves in Figure 6-6, in which the
gaps between both approaches become narrowed as the tolerable latency t0 increases.
Figure 6-7 shows successful ratio as a function of the number of the devices with
uploading data using SDUM and GDUS. In the performance comparison, best case
and worst case are considered. From Figure 6-7(a), we can note that the successful
ratio of both SDUM and GDUS increases as the number of the devices with uploading
data M increases, and turn out to be diminishing returns, which can be explained as
below. As the number of the devices with uploading data is becoming more, there
are more data uploading tasks in the deployed area, so more devices are inclined to
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Figure 6-5: Successful ratio for SDUM and GDUS using three typical tolerable relia-






































Figure 6-6: Successful ratio for SDUM and GDUS using three typical tolerable latency
t0 for best case and worst case.
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Figure 6-7: Successful ratio versus number of the devices with uploading data using
SDUM and GDUS for (a) best case and (b) worst case.
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profits from those newly publicized tasks. However, each device only participates
in one coalition, when there are too many tasks in the networks, D2D cooperation
between devices become saturated, and thus the successful ratio increases to reach a
stable value, which leads to the diminishing returns of the curves.
Besides, we also note from Figure 6-7(b) that when M is small for the worst case,
the trends of SDUM and GDUS are similar with those of best case. However, when M
is large, successful ratio with both schemes will decrease as the number of the devices
with uploading data M increasing. Due to the fact that the total radio resource keeps
unchanged, but the allocated radio resource of each device becomes less with increase
of device number M , which leads to a higher data uploading latency. Therefore,
there must exist a optimal M with which the successful ratio reaches the maximum
value, i.e., the trade-off between the allocated radio resource and data uploading tasks
can be achieved. In both cases, as the number of the devices with uploading data
M increases, the gap between SDUM and GDUS becomes bigger and bigger, such
behavior can be attributed to the incentive impact of data uploading reliability on
successful ratio, which makes the SDUM perform better than the GDUS.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we studied social-aware data uploading underlaying cellular networks
with consideration of D2D communications. A new incentive mechanism was pro-
posed to compensate the resource consumption of devices on data uploading. To
maximize the individual reward, the devices in proximity were willing to construct a
multi-hop D2D chain to assist the other devices for data uploading. After that, we
introduced coalitional game to formulate the problem of social-aware data uploading
based D2D cooperation among devices, and then devised a merge-and-split forma-
tion algorithm to obtain the solution for formulated D2D chain. Through extensive
simulations, we obtained the optimal scale factor α and β for best case and worst
case, and then we provided numerical results to demonstrate the effectiveness of the




This chapter summarizes our contributions and discusses the future research direc-
tions.
7.1 Summary of the Thesis
In this thesis, we studied the low-latency data uploading in D2D-enabled cellular
networks with the help of device cooperation, human social relationship and incentive
mechanism. First, we considered D2D cooperation among both the devices with
uploading data and the ones without uploading data and proposed a generalized
cooperative data uploading scheme to reduce data uploading latency. Considering
the data uploading reliability, we further investigated the impact of human social
relationships on cooperative behaviors, where the nearby devices with mutual trust
can build D2D cooperative relationships. Under this social network scenario, an
incentive mechanism was finally proposed to motivate more devices to participate in
the D2D cooperation, such that the data uploading latency can be further reduced
and data uploading reliability can be enhanced. The main contributions of this thesis
are summarized as follows.
• For generalized cooperative data uploading scheme, we introduced a NTU coali-
tional game to formulate the problem of D2D cooperation among the devices.
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Then we devised a merge-and-split formation algorithm to obtain the solution
for the formulated coalitional game, where the devices within communication
range were rewarded to establish D2D cooperation and then formed the multi-
hop D2D chains for data uploading. It is expected that our proposed scheme can
effectively reduce the average data uploading latency compared to the existing
schemes.
• For cooperative D2D data uploading with the consideration of human social
relationship, we investigated the impact of human social relationships on coop-
erative behaviors, and then formulated the problem of D2D cooperation as a
coalitional game. Based on the formulated coalitional game, we further devised
a chain formation algorithm to implement D2D chain construction, where the
devices with the poor uplink channel quality were first considered to join D2D
cooperation and the bottom to top mode was adopted to construct the D2D
chains. The numerical results demonstrated that the average data uploading
latency can be futher reduced by adopting our proposed algorithm.
• In Chapter 6, we investigated cooperative D2D data uploading in social net-
work scenario. An incentive mechanism was then adopted to motivate more
devices to participate in the D2D cooperation. With this incentive mechanism,
the nearby devices can obtain reward such that they were willing to construct a
multi-hop D2D chain to assist the other devices for data uploading. To this end,
we adopted coalitional game to formulate the D2D chain with careful consider-
ation of social-aware data uploading, and then designed a coalition formation
algorithm with merge-and-split rules to determine the solution for formulated
D2D chain. Extensive simulation results indicated that the performance gain
of our incentive mechanism outperforms ones with non-incentive mechanism.
7.2 Future Work
We summarize the future interesting directions as follows.
82
• In this thesis, we study the data uploading in cellular networks with the consid-
eration of D2D cooperation among static devices, one interesting future direc-
tion is to further explore the impact of device mobility on cooperative behaviors,
which has been largely neglected in most literature.
• We only focus on how to forward data to the BS with high-reliability and low-
latency, another interesting direction is how to recruit the devices to collect
data by leveraging D2D cooperation while satisfying the coverage probability
over the field of interest. It is also interesting to guarantee reliable service
quality and wide-area coverage.
• It is notable that our studies in this thesis consider cooperative D2D data up-
loading in 4G LTE cellular networks, so that the data uploading latency can be
greatly reduced. Another interesting direction is to further extend the current
4G cellular system to the fifth generation (5G) communication system, which
can provide high data rates, high resource utilization, low latency, high system
capacity and quality of service (QoS). Thus, it will be interesting topic to devel-
op cooperative D2D data uploading scheme in 5G cellular networks, and really
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